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Abstract: 
The aim of this paper is to compare German and New Zealand privacy law. Therefore, the paper introduces the 
Jaw of privacy in each country; outlines the development and the present status and compares the level of 
protection achieved in New Zealand with the level of privacy protection in Germany. Emphasis is on the aspect 
of privacy invasion by (intimate) covert filming. Nevertheless general aspects of privacy law are also illustrated 
as it will be necessary to establish an understanding for the matter. 
The paper contributes to the debate on the need for privacy protection by providing an analysis of the nature of 
the problem, potential areas of conflict and compatible objectives. Dealing with the enacted provisions and the 
recent developments in New Zealand case law this paper argues that New Zealand still provides insufficient 
protection of privacy. 
As will be seen, privacy law in Germany is more developed. Due to the lack of adequate provisions and statutes 
as well as the uncertainty of the case law it is suggested that in specified areas of privacy New Zealand law could 
use German law as a starting point to consider whether a similar scope should be protected and to develop 
privacy protection. Nevertheless it is also recognised that some fields of privacy that are not protected under 
New Zealand law at the moment can still be ignored due to the fact that there are different societies. 
Word Count: 
This paper contains (excluding contents page, abstract and bibliography) 16954 words . 
I INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to outline the development and the present status of a right to privacy 
in New Zealand and to compare it with the level of privacy protection in Germany. Emphasis 
shall be on the aspect of privacy invasion by (intimate) covert filming. Nevertheless general 
aspects of privacy law are also illustrated as it will be necessary to establish a understanding 
for the matter. 
Warren and Brandeis already m 1890 noticed the need of a right to pnvacy when they 
argued: 1 
"The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of 
decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a 
trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the 
details of sexual relations are spread broadcast on the columns of the daily papers ... Each 
crop of unseemly gossip, thus harvested, becomes the seed of more, and in direct proportion 
to its circulation, results in a lowering of social standards and of morality. Even gossip 
apparently harmless, when widely and persistently circulated, is potent for evil. It both 
belittles and perverts." 
If this were true in 1890 the strong need for privacy nowadays is apparent due to the mass 
media in the globalised world of today. In fact, the ability of the media to expose information 
is only likely to be exacerbated as intrusive technology and methods of entrapment evolve. 2 
Technical developments in digital shooting and computing have increased the capacity for 
accessing, gathering, recording, processing and linking image data. With this technology not 
only the media but also private people become a more apparent threat to the privacy of other 
people. For example, with the use of mobile phones with built-in cameras it is possible for 
nearly everybody to make snapshots in multitudinous (private) situations and instantaneously 
publish them on Internet sites.3 A recent example took place in Hamilton where a man tried to 
take pictures with his mobile phone-camera of a woman in a Hamilton ladies' toilet.4 In the 
1 Samuel D Warren and Brandeis Louis D "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 Harv L Rev 193, 195. 2 Lawrence M Friedman "The one way mirror: Law, privacy, and the media" (2004) 82(2) WULQ 319. 
Friedman states: 'The technology of intrusion advances more rapidly than the social technology of containment. 
We have to ask: how can we preserve human privacy, and human dignity, in times when these values are under 
ceaseless technological attack?" 342. 
3 For example www.buzznet.com. 
4 Helen Prattley "Peeping Tom tried to take pies of woman on toilet" (17 August 2005) National News Story 
<http://www.stuff.eo .nz/stuff/0,2 l 06,33807 l 8al 1,00.html> (last accessed 3 September 2005). 
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same way a neighbour can, from his property, photograph two lovers having a private and 
intimate conversation in their garden in seclusion and send this picture on the Internet. 
The following paper contributes to the debate on the need for privacy protection by providing 
an analysis of the nature of the problem, potential areas of conflict and compatible objectives. 
Dealing with the enacted provisions and the recent developments in New Zealand case law 
this paper argues that New Zealand still provides insufficient protection of privacy. Due to the 
lack of adequate provisions and statutes as well as the uncertainty of the case law it is 
suggested that in specified areas of privacy New Zealand law could use German law as a 
starting point to develop privacy protection. 
II COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY 
Much has been written about the correct methodology in comparative works5. The aim of this 
paper is not to assess and discuss different comparative methods. However, some useful 
comparative principles shall be mentioned briefly. The focus of the paper shall be on the legal 
protection of individuals in cases concerning their privacy. Starting point of the comparison is 
the principle of functionability. This principle - simplified - states that only those things are 
comparable which fulfil the same function. The question whether two legal institutions fulfil 
the same function has to be approached from the factual situation. It will - referring to the 
above example - be asked which remedies are available in the different law systems to prevent 
a newspaper or an internet provider from publishing a picture. The search for these remedies 
will encompass the entire German and New Zealand legal systems and all sources which 
affect the law in those systems. As will be seen, the privacy cases provide a very good 
example for the different approaches of two different legal systems to the same factual 
situation. Whereas, in Germany, reference will mostly be made to the general right to one's 
personality, different areas of law, for example defamation or trespass, can play a role in new 
Zealand. This comparison of specific legal institutions is known as microcomparison. 
Microcomparison in many cases only makes sense if it is conducted together with a 
compaiison of the general "spi1it and style" of a legal system. The comparison of two legal 
systems on this "global" level can be referred to as macrocomparison. As will be seen, 
5 Konrad Zweigert, Kotz Hein Introduction to Comparative Law (3ed Clarendon Press, Oxford 1992); John C Reitz "How to Do Comparative Law" (1998) 46 American Journal of Comparative Law 617 . 
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macrocomparison will be important for this work in several respects. First, reference to the 
function of the legislature and judicature in each legal system will provide an understanding 
of the development of privacy law in the two countries. Second, unlike the New Zealand legal 
system, the German Constitution provides for the protection of fundamental rights which, in 
tum , have a great effect on privacy protection. And last, the remedies available in both , the 
German and the New Zealand legal system, will - mostly - be found in the law of torts. 
Reference shall however not be confined to legal provi sions. Where appropriate, the impact of 
- inter alia - philosophical, psychological or sociological works on the notion of privacy shall 
be described. Finally, it will be seen that it is necessary to describe the different historical 
backgrounds of the two countries which have a major influence on privacy law.6 
The last question that arises concerns the structure of this comparative work. The aim will be 
to make as many sections as possible comparative.7 For example, the relevant New Zealand 
law for the publication of pictures shall be described in the context of the German privilege as 
to ones own picture. 
III THE GERMAN AND NEW ZEALAND LEGAL SYSTEM 
The operation of privacy laws in Germany and New Zealand has to be assessed against the 
main characteristics of the legal systems in those countries and cannot be understood without 
the impact of the legislature and judicature. Apart from many similarities, especially in 
respect to the legislature, an important difference between the legal systems is that in New 
Zealand - based on the common law tradition - certain court decisions are binding sources of 
law. The following account shall provide a simplified overview of the two country's legal 
systems. 
A Germany 
The German Basic Law is the paramount source of law. All other legal norms have to 
confo1m with its principles and values. 8 Placed at its head9 is a bill of fundamental rights 
6 Reitz as above n 5, principle 5. 
7 Reitz as above n 5, principle 8. 
8 Howard D Fisher The German Legal System & Legal Language (3ed London 2002) 19. 9 Articles l - 19 Basic Law 
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which, as will be seen, plays an important role in German privacy law. 10 Since Germany's 
legal system is dominated by codes of law, it can be described as a civil law system. 11 
Even if there is no (strict) doctrine of precedent in German law and the judges are not 
supposed to create law, 
12 
the judicature is responsible for applying, interpreting and hence 
developing the law as long as it acts within the limits imposed by the German Constitution. 13 
As will be seen, the German legislature has not had such a great impact on the development of 
a right to privacy, especially the general right to one's personality, as one might think. There 
are some legislative provisions that protect aspects of privacy. Federal laws, for example §§ 
201 - 204 of the Criminal Code and § 823 II of the Civil Code, protect the secrecy of the 
spoken word or letters. The central part of German privacy protection, the general right to 
one's personality, has however been developed by German courts, especiaJJy the Federal 
Constitutional Court (FCC) and the Federal Court. Remedies for individuals are available 
under tort law. 
B New Zealand 
Contrary to Germany, New Zealand law is based upon the common law tradition. Therefore, 
the sources of law are statutes enacted by the Parliament and case law stemming from the 
courts. 
New Zealand courts create law in that, in certain circumstances, the decisions of some courts 
are binding upon others 
14 
Many of the principles of the New Zealand law were developed in 
the English courts and have been - New Zealand being a fo1mer colony of the British Empire 
- adopted and approved in New Zealand courts. Other rules have subsequently been 
developed by New Zealand courts. As to the relation between the two sources of law, 
legislation will prevail against case law. Since New Zealand is a democratic society, the 
Parliament as the representative of the people has the final say. The judges wiJJ however still 
be responsible for interpreting the statutory Jaws and applying them to concrete situations. As 
will be seen , there are, already, many statutes that partially and/or incidentally protect privacy 
1° Fisher. as above n 8, 23 . 
11 
Nigel Foster German Legal System & Laws (3ed London 2002) 5. 
12 
Foster as above n 11, 4. 
13 
BverfG Soraya (1973) NJW 891 , 892. 
14 
The doctrine of precedent. 
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in some respects, for example 15 the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993, 
the Privacy Act 1993 or the Summary Offences Act 1981. 
Additionally, pnvacy 1s partially covered by existing causes of action such as trespass, 
nuisance, breach of confidence, harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional harm. 
However, as decision in Hosking v Runting16 shows, it seems so far that decisive steps to 
protect privacy not only will be taken by the judicature but also by Parliament. Similarly, the 
law of defamation, for example, can play a role in privacy cases. Much of that law has been 
developed by the courts. 
IV PRIVACY - A LEGAL RIGHT- HISTORY, IDEAS AND SCOPE 
The theoretical foundations of privacy have to be read together with (and sometimes cannot 
be divided from) historical developments in order to understand the discussion of a legal right 
of privacy. History shows that privacy, even though it has long been subject to intellectual 
works, has not always been a concept legally acknowledged. It was hardly acknowledged by 
the monarchies and churchmen of the Middle Ages who were more occupied with the 
constant battles for and reservation of their power 17 which included the idea of a distinctly 
public realm and a corresponding delineation of a private sphere. 18 However, at those times, 
privacy was not an issue of ptimary concern to the people. Urban life was hardly known and 
people could enjoy intimacy and solitude merely because of the distance between their houses. 
A need for (physical and psychological) privacy emerged with the urbanisation of the society 
and the growth of population of urban centres and their busy city-lives. Correspondingly, the 
spread of newspapers from the eighteenth century on had an effect on the inquisitiveness of 
the people which, in tum, led to a development of aggressiveness by, and content of personal 
nature in, the newspapers. Further, technological inventions - printing, telegraphy, 
photography - generated fears and were perceived to be potential threats to privacy. Also state 
15 The non exhaustive list also includes the Privacy Act 1993, Defamation Act 1992, Crimes Act 1961. Summary Offences Act 1981, Victims' Rights Act 2002, Telecommunications Act 2001, Radiocommunications Act 1989 and the Criminal Records Act 2004. Although these statutes do not provide an enforceable right to privacy they do address at least specific privacy issues. 
16 Hosking v Runting [2005] l NZLR l (CA). 
17 Richard F Hixson Privacy in a Public Society - Human Rights in Conflict (Oxford University Press, New York 1987) 6. 
18 Raymond Wacks Privacy Volume I, The Concept of Privacy (Hong Kong 1993) xi. 
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authorities increasingly began to demand accounts of individuals' lives and affairs. 19 
Therefore, it was especially from the later part of the nineteenth century on that writers began 
to think of p1ivacy in terms of legal protection. 20 The same privacy concerns as at the end of 
the 19th century apply (even more) today. Personal information has a (commercial) value that 
public authorities and business companies are eager to obtain. Permanent intrusions into 
privacy by the press are part of the modem society. Modern information and surveillance 
technologies in the information age enable supervision of individuals, the collection and 
dissemination of a high level of information about individuals and an increase of intrusions 
· · 21 mto pnvacy. 
In assessing the history of a legal right to privacy, two main justifications for its existence can 
be found: developments in the society and technological advances that endanger privacy22 on 
the one hand, the legal recognition of personal autonomy, self-determination, human dignity 
and liberty
23 
on the other. In 1890, Warren and Brandeis noted that the law had to pay more 
regard to human emotions and that "recent inventions and business methods call attention for 
the next step [ of developing the law] which must be taken for the protection of the persons, 
and for securing ... the right to be let alone". They went on to state that instantaneous 
photographs, mechanical devices and newspapers have "invaded the sacred precincts of 
private and domestic life".
24 
An emphasis on human dignity, on the other hand, can be found 
in German jurisprudence. "The right to free development of one's personality and human 
dignity safeguards for everyone the sphere of autonomy in which to shape his private life by 
developing and protecting his personality". 25 
Much has been written about a legal concept of privacy and its scope of protection. From 
these sources, it is apparent that the idea of a legal right to privacy is very vague and it is 
19 Hixson, as above n 17, 8. 
20 
Hixson, as above n 17, 6 - 25. 
21 
Tim Dixon "Valuing Privacy: an Overview and Introduction" (2001) 24 (1) UNSWLJ 239, 240; Hixson, as 
above n 17, 27; Simone Davies "Unprincipled Privacy: Why the Foundations of Data Protection are Failing us" 
(2001) 24 (1) UNSWLJ 284,285; John B Young Privacy (Chichester 1978) 4, 5. 
22 
Young, as above n 21, 4,5; Hixson, as above n 17, 27; Jillian Caldwell "Protecting Privacy Post Lenah: Should 
The Courts Establish A New Tort Or Develop Breach Of Confidence?" (2003) 26 UNSWLR 91, 92. 
23 
BGHZ 13, 334; Art. 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 
UNTS; Young, as above n 21, 2; Megan Richardson "Whither Breach of Confidence: A Right of Privacy for 
Australia?" (2002) 26 Melb U LR 381,389. 
24 
Warren, Brandeis as above n 1,203. 
25 
BverfG Soraya [1973) NJW 891,892. 
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impossible to develop a unitary definition. 26 Warren and Brandeis define privacy as "a right 
to be let alone", the German Federal Court of Justice (FCJ) as "a right to be oneself, to belong 
to oneself'. 27 In the legal definitions, much of the theoretical foundations described above are 
reflected. They all acknowledge that privacy relates to some kind of control or to personal 
decision-making. 28 Protection against non-consensual aquisition or disclosures of personal 
information, photographs without consent and intrusions into physical seclusion are located at 
the core of privacy protection.29 (Especially the German) parts of this paper will show how a 
concept as vague as privacy can be put into shape and concrete terms and how it can be 
balanced against competing legal interests. 
V GENERAL INTRODUCTION INTO GERMAN AND NEW ZEALAND PRIVACY 
LAW 
A German law 
1 Historical development and constitutional context 
The general right to one's personality - as elaborated by the FCC30 - protects the intimate, 
personal and secret spheres, personal honour, the right to dispose over the representation of 
one's own personality in public, the right of controlling one's image, the right of the own, 
spoken word, the right not to be falsely quoted, the right to informational self-determination 
and the protection against untruths about oneself3 1. This broad protection of privacy cannot be 
understood without looking at Germany's historical and constitutional background. 
26 Wacks, as above n 21, xii; Young, as above n 21; Paul Telford "Grosse v Purvis: its place in the common law 
of privacy" (2003) 10 Privacy Law & Policy Reporter, 66, 68. 
27 BGH Caroline von Monaco JJI [1996] NJW 1128, 1129. 
28 Caldwell, as above n 22, 93. Intimacy, confidentiality, seclusion, solitude, withdrawal from society, self-
determination, independence, autonomy in personal and spiritual concerns, secrecy of communication, 
information about a person, private affairs, realm of a person 's own, or, correspondingly, indecent conduct, 
unwarranted intrusion, unreasonable interference, unwanted publicity, unwarranted appropriation or exploitation 
of one's personality, surveillance or observation are - inter alia - terms employed in connection with a right to 
privacy see Young, as above n 21, 17 ff.; Graham Greenleaf "The Australian Privacy Charter - a new 
benchmark?" (1995) 69 ALJ 90; Alan F Westin Privacy and Freedom (New York 1970) 11. 29 Art. 17 of the /11ternatio11al Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, as above n 23; Caldwell, as above n 22, 
93. 
30 BverfG Eppler [ 1980] NJW 2070, 2071. 
31 As to the different classifications of the general right of personality see Matthias Prinz, Butz Peters 
Medienrecht - Die zivilrechtlichen Ansprueche (Beck Muenchen 1999) 65 ff.. 
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There was no general right to one's personality in Germany in the 19th and early 20th century. 
The Geiman Reichsgericht32 in its jurisprudence consistently neglected the acknowledgment 
of such a right, holding that the legal system did not provide for it, 33 even though German law 
provided for other protection of the personality. For example, the Act on Artistic Creation 
(AAC)34 from 1907 generally prohibited the publication of a person's picture without his or 
her consent. 35 The attitude of the Reichsgericht was adopted by the Committee that drafted 
the German Civil Code. The Committee stated that non-tangible values should not be placed 
at the same level as property interests and that the Ci vii Code should not provide for a 
protection of personality rights. Consequently, the individual's personality was not protected 
sufficiently by the German Civil Code, even though some provisions protected certain aspects 
of the personality. 36 The first attempts to recognise a broader general right of privacy were 
hence made by leading academics. 37 
It was not until 1954 that the German Federal Court of Justice acknowledged the existence of 
a general right to one's personality in its famous Leserbrief-decision.38 In this case, a lawyer 
required the correction of an article in a journal under the Press Act in the name of his client. 
The journal printed this request under the heading "Letters from Readers", leaving out parts 
from which it would have become clear that the letter was not a "Letter from a Reader". The 
court held: 
"Now that the basic law has recognised the right of a human being to have his dignity 
respected and also the right to free development of his personality, . . . , the general 
personality right must be regarded as a constitutionally guaranteed freedom having regard 
to Articles39 1 and 2".40 
32 The highest court a that time. 
33 RGZ 79, 398; RGZ 82, 334; RGZ 94, 1; Prinz Peters, as above n 31, 50. 
34 Kunsturhebergesetz. 
35 For a further account of personality protection under German law at that time see B S Markesinis The German 
Law of Obligations, Volume II The Law of Torts: A Comparative Introduction (3ed. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1997) 65. 
36 For example, § 12 of the Civil Code establishes the right to a name. 
37 Markesinis, as above n 35, 63, 64. 
38 BGHZ 13,334; BGH Leserbrief[l9541 NJW 1404, 1405 translated in Markesinis, as above n 35,376 case 30. 39 Art. 1 I l of the German Constitution: "The dignity of the human being is inviolable."; Art. 2 I of the German 
Constitution: "Everyone has the right to free development of his personality, insofar as he does not injure the 
rights of others or violate the constitutional order or the moral law." ; translated in Sabine Michalowski , Lorna 
Woods German Constitllfional Law, The protection of civil liberties (Hants 1999) 97 and 109. 
40 BGHZ 13,334; BGH Leserbrief, as above n 35, 1405. 
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The Court thus held that every person has the right to decide whether and in which form his 
letters or other notes shall be made available to the public and that the publication of such 
notes without the consent of the author would be an infringement of his personality rights. 
The lawyer could therefore successfully insist that the journal revoke its statement that the 
letter of the lawyer was a "Letter from a Reader". In the Soraya-decision,41 the FCC held that 
the FCJ acted within the German Constitution when it developed the general right to one's 
personality independently of any legislative provisions. Subsequently, it has approved the 
existence of the general right to one's personality in several decisions. 42 Further, many 
decisions concerning the general right to one's personality have been passed by lower 
courts.43 The different aspects of the general right of personality have been put in concrete 
form both by the FCC and the German FCJ. However, this enumeration is not exhaustive and 
open to future development.44 
The acknowledgement of a general right of personality finds, as stated, its basis in Article 1 (1) 
and Artticle 2 ( l) of the German Constitution and, in tum, cannot be understood without 
looking at the historical background and the development of basic rights in German law.45 
Basic rights have been implemented m vanous previous constitutions. The 
Paulskirchenversammlung van 1848 declared the basic rights of the German people, the 
Preufiische Verfassungsurkunde van 1850 comprised a broad catalogue of basic rights and 
several constitutions of the Federal States provided for the protection of certain basic rights. 
However, the legal effect of these rights has been, for various reasons, very confined. They 
have, for example, not had binding effect upon the legislation and have not applied equally to 
all citizens.46 The next, very broad catalogue of basic rights could be found in Articles 109 -
165, of the Weimarer Reichsverfassung van 191947 This Constitution was however de facto 
invalidated by the seizure of power by the National-Socialists in 1933 and the inconceivable 
disregard of the human being as such that followed during the time of their power. It was 
mainly this experience with the continuing and grave violations and disregard of human 
beings, their life and their dignity by the National-Socialists that influenced the emphasis on 
41 BverfG Soraya, as above n 13, 892. 
42 BverfG Scienrologen [1997] NJW 2669, 2670; BverfG Lebach (1973] NJW 1226. 1227; BverfG Soraya, as 
above n 13, 892. 
43 Prinz, Peters as above n 31, 63. 
44 BverfG Eppler, as above n 30, 2071; Prinz, Peters. as above n 31 , 62 ff. 
45 See the Liirh-decision of the FCC, BverfGE 7, 198. 
46 It would be beyond the scope of this paper to give an exact account of the development of basic rights in 
Germany. For details see Bodo Pieroth, Schlink Bernhard Medienrecht - Die ::.ivilrechtlichen Ansprueche (Beck 
Muenchen 1999) 8 ff.. 
47 Constitution of Weimar; Pieroth, Schlink, as above n 46, 7. 
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basic rights in the German Constitution of Bonn of 1949.48 "The memory of the national-
socialist background, with its many attempts to discover and revive traditional German values 
had affected the law in almost all its aspects and was still alive, so the framers of the 
Constitution deliberately placed at the head of the constitutional text nineteen articles dealing 
with fundamental human rights." 49 Those basic rights are of paramount importance in the 
German legal system.so 
From this historical background, it can be understood why the German FCJ in its Leserbrief-
decision acknowledged the existence of a general right to one's personality and changed the 
adjudication of its predecessor, the Reichsgericht.s 1 
2 General introduction into the general right to one's personality 
For a full understanding of the protection of the general right to one's personality, some more 
points have to be stressed. First, it has to be noted that Article 1 III of the German 
Constitution provides that the "basic rights bind the legislative, the executive and the judiciary 
as directly valid law" which means that they are operative against state authorities. This paper 
is however confined to horizontal protection of privacy. It is the so-called problem of the 
effect on third parties of the basic rights52 which raises the question of whether and to what 
extent the basic rights have a secondary effect in the realm of private law.s3 The FCC held54 
that the basic rights - as paramount constitutional Jaw - form an objective system of values, 
which, via the medium of the general clauses of the German Civil Code, influence the private 
law of the land and therefore have to be observed also in civil law cases. All rules of the 
private law have therefore to be construed in accordance with the spirit of the basic rights and 
have to be interpreted so as to conform with the German Constitution.ss 
48 Pieroth, Schlink, as above n 46, 12, 13. 
49 Markesinis, as above n 35, 28. 
50 BverfG Liith, as above n 45 ; Pieroth. Schlink, as above n 46, 12. 
5 1 Prinz, Peters, as above n 31, 5 l. 
52 An exact description of the different legal positions as to this - disputed - problem would go beyond the scope 
of this paper. The Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht) favoures a direct applicability of the basic rights 
in the relation between individuals, see BAGE 4, 240; BAGE l , 258; Markesinis, as above n 32 , 28. 
53 Raimund Youngs Sourcebook on German Law (Southampton 1994) 102. 
54 BverfG Liith, as above n 45, 205 . 
55 For an exhaustive description of the problem of Drittwirkung der Grundrechte see Pieroth, Schlink, as above n 
46, 43 ff. 
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The second point that has to be made is that, as described, the general right to one's 
personality is derived from the basic rights of the German Constitution. Applying basic rights 
is however always a balance of interests. Therefore, the general right to one's personality is a 
Rahmenrecht. 56 This means that an intrusion into the scope of the personality right hardly 
ever is per se illegal. The right of personality has to be balanced with other basic rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution. One of those opposing interests will often be the equally 
important need to preserve the freedoms of speech, press, broadcasts, arts and science57 that 
are protected by the German Constitution.58 
The balance of interests is of major importance and has to be weighed in every single case, 
always bearing in mind the equal value that has been given to the opposing legal values. The 
case-law will only provide useful guidelines but not binding rules. 59 The Lebach-decision60 of 
the FCC illustrates the complexity of this balance. In that case, the issue in question was 
whether a documentary movie about a murder of soldiers in which the accomplice was 
identified with his name could be broadcast. 61 The accomplice sought to restrain the broadcast 
by relying on his general right to one's personality (the privilege as to the own picture).62 This 
had to be balanced against the freedom of broadcasts of the television station.63 
56 Frame right; Prinz, Peters, as above n 31, 63, 64. 
57 Markesinis, as above n 32, 66, 67. 
58 Art. 5 I of the German Constitution: "Everybody has the right freely to express and disseminate their opinions 
orally, in writing or visually and to obtain information from generally accessible sources without hindrance. 
Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting through audio-visual media shall be guaranteed. There shall be no 
censorship"; Art. 5 III l of the German Constitution: "Art and scholarship, research and teaching shall be 
unrestricted"; translated in Michalowski, Woods, as above n 36, 199 and 227. 
59 Markesinis, as above n 32, 66. 
60 BverfG Lebach, as above n 42; translated in Markesinis, as above n 32, 390. 
61 See also below. 
62 See §§ 22, 23 of the Act on Artistic Creations. 
63 BverfG Lebach, as above n 42, 1226; The court held: "In cases of conflict ... the freedom to broadcast must 
not be restricted excessively. On the other hand .. . the restriction of the freedom to broadcast serves in turn to 
protect an important concern of the Constitution; the interest of the person affected to prohibit the publication of 
his likeness or any representation of his person .. . is directly enhanced by the constitutional guarantee of the 
protection of the personality. In solving this conflict it must be remembered that according to the intention of the 
Constitution both constitutional concerns are essential aspects of the liberal-democratic order of the Constitution 
with the result that neither can claim precedence in principle. The view of humanity taken by the Constitution 
and the corresponding structure of the community within the State require both the respect for the independence 
of individual personality and the guarantee of a liberal social atmosphere; the latter cannot be realized at the 
present times unless communications are unimpeded. In case of conflict both concerns of the Constitution must 
be adjusted, if possible; if this cannot be achieved it must be determined which interest must be postponed 
having regard to the nature of the case and to any special circumstances. For this purpose, both concerns of the 
Constitution, centred as they are on human dignity, must be regarded as the nucleus of the system of 
constitutional concerns. Accordingly, the freedom to broadcast may have the effect of restricting any claims 
based on the right of personality; however, the damage to personality resulting from a public representation must 
not be out of proportion to the importance of the publication upholding the freedom of communication. 
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Furthermore it follows from these guiding principles that the required weighing of interests 
must take into account the intensity of the infringement of the personal sphere by the 
broadcast on the one hand; on the other hand, the specific interest which is affected by the 
broadcast and is capable of being thus served, must be assessed and examined as to whether 
and to what extent it can be satisfied even without any interference - or a less far-reaching 
interference - with the protection of personality". In the particular case, the court held that the 
right of the public to be informed about matters in the current public interest would, in cases 
of grave criminal offences, outweigh the personality right of the (convicted) criminal and that 
the offenders could be mentioned in coverage. In the circumstances of the case, however, the 
broadcast of the movie was disproportionate. Since some time had elapsed between the 
murders and the broadcast, the latter was no longer of topical interest and endangered the 
criminal ' s re-socialisation. Hence, he - again - had an interest to be let alone from the public. 
In consequence, the right not to be identified of criminal offenders will, with time passing by, 
prevail against the public interest to be informed. 
Further, it has to be noted that if statutory law protects the same scope as a particular aspect of 
the general right of personality, the basic law always prevails and has to be applied. Hence, as 
will be seen below, the protection of the own picture provided for in§ 22 f. of the AAC has to 
be applied in these cases.64 Finally, as will be seen, it will in (many) cases be difficult to draw 
a line between the different aspects of the general right to one ' s personality and the different 
aspects might in instances interact.65 
B New Zealand law 
During the last twenty years besides the "classical" torts,66 a tort of invasion of privacy was 
recognised in Tucker, 67 Bradley, 68 and also in Morgan 69 and C v Wilson. 70 Referring to 
enacted legislation in the privacy field71 and US authorities in Tucker, a claim for breach of 
64 Prinz, Peters, as above n 31, 67, 68. 
65 Prinz, Peters, as above n 31, 65. 
66 Causes of action such as trespass, nuisance, breach of confidence, harassment, and intentional infliction of 
emotional harm. 
67 Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 716. 
68 Bradley v Wingnut Films Ltd (1993) l NZLR 415. 
69 Morgan v Television New Zealand Ltd HC Christchurch 1 March 1990 CP 67 /90. 
7° C v Wilson and Horton Ltd HC Auckland 27 May 1992 CP 765/92. 
7 1 Human Rights Commission Act 1977, Wanganui Computer Centre Act 1976, Crimes Act 1961 and 
Broadcasting Act 1976. 
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privacy was accepted as arguable.72 The existence of the named tort was clearly supported by 
the case of Bradle/3 where Gallen J stated that a tort of privacy formed part of the law, but 
refused to grant an injunction.74 Nevertheless, the mere consideration of the application and 
the fact that Gallen J noticed three actual requirements of this tort showed its existence. In P v 
D, Nicholson J granted an injunction preventing publication of the fact that P had been treated 
at a psychiat1ic hospital, on the grounds of invasion of privacy.75 Additionally, the three step 
test developed in Bradley was extended by adding the fourth premise that "the public must 
not have a legitimate interest in having the information made available."76 In L v G the court 
accepted the four elements set out in P v D and awarded damages against G for breach of 
privacy for publishing sexually explicit pictures which he took during his meetings with Las 
a prostitute.77 Since Hosking v Runting78 New Zealand common law now provides a remedy 
in tort for privacy invasion. With this decision, one could suppose that a new era of privacy 
protection has begun. 
Parliament, on the other hand, passed several statutes that do not provide an enforceable right 
to privacy, however do address at least specific privacy issues. 79 In 1993 Parliament has 
recognised the right of privacy by the adoption of the Privacy Act 1993 and the Broadcasting 
Act 1989. However they are both not as comprehensive as the emerging tort. The Privacy Act 
does not "create tortious rights and duties"80 and the Broadcasting Act8 1 applies only to the 
72 Tucker, as above n 57, 716. The plaintiff had undertaken a publicity campaign to raise funds for a heart 
transplant. He had criminal convictions, including those relating to indecency. The evidence suggested that 
publication could cause Tucker grievous physical or emotional harm. An interim injunction was granted but later 
discharged, because organisations other than the defendants had already revealed the convictions to the public. 
73 Bradley, as above n 58, 425 . 
74 Gallen J in Bradley, as above n 58, 423 applied the first three steps of the test proposed by William Prosser 
and Keaton 011 the Law of Torts (5ed 1984) 856. The three steps are: (1) That the disclosure of the private facts 
must be a public disclosure and not a private one; (2) Facts disclosed to the public must be private facts and not 
public ones; (3) The matter made public must be one, which would be highly offensive and objectionable to a 
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. 
75 P v D [2000J 2 NZLR 591. 
76 P v D, as above n 75,601 Nicholson J. 
77 L v C [2002] DCR 234. 
78 Hosking v R1111ting [2003) 3 NZLR 385 (HC). 
79 These include the Harassment Act 1997, Telecommunications Act 2001, Criminal Records Act 2004, 
Summary Offences Act 1981 , Postal Services Act 1987, Defamation Act 1992, Crimes Act 1961, Victims' 
Rights Act 2002 and the Radiocommunications Act 1989. 
80 Hosking v Ru11ti11g (HC), as above n 78, 413 Randerson J. 
81 The BSA protects against the public disclosure of private facts where the facts disclosed are highly offensive 
and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. Therefore the principles developed by the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority are quite similar to the test developed by Nicholson J in P v D, as above n 75, 
591. 
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media. In 2002 the Law Commission published another catalogue of rights, which are covered 
by the law of privacy.82 
Furthermore, even if the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA) was passed to "affirm New 
Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights"83 , it does 
not give a general guarantee of privacy. 84 Section 21, 85 the right to be secure against 
unreasonable search and seizure, "affords protection against invasion of privacy in relation to 
person or property" and section 28 preserves existing rights86 
Additionally, as will be seen, there are several torts protecting the right of privacy. Causes of 
action such as trespass, nuisance, breach of confidence, and intentional infliction of emotional 
harm have existed for a long time and protect certain aspects of privacy.87 All these aspects 
can be part of the privacy of a person, but these causes of action are designed to protect other 
interests. The protection of privacy interests is only a by-product. They do not provide a 
unique protection of privacy itself and cannot be developed in this way without losing their 
original shape. Therefore these remedies do not provide sufficient protection of privacy.88 
C Comparison of the German and New Zealand position 
The first obvious difference between German and New Zealand law is the terminology used. 
Whereas German law generally speaks of "personality rights" or "general right to one' s 
personality", New Zealand law more commonly adopts terms as "privacy protection" or the 
"tort of invasion of privacy". This however does not necessarily mean that the aim is to 
protect different situations or values in the different systems. As will be seen , cases that fall 
within the scope of the German general right to one's personality might well fall within the 
scope of what is referred to as privacy under New Zealand law. Moreover, three aspects that 
form the core of the German general right to one's personality (the intimate, personal and 
secret spheres) might be refened to as "privacy" in English language. As will be seen, the 
82 New Zealand Law Commission Protecting Personal Information from Disclosure (2002) Preliminary Paper 49. 
83 New Zealand Bill Of Rights Act 1990. 
84 R v Jefferies (1994) l NZLR 290,302 (CA) Richardson J. 
85 Section 21 of the BORA states : "Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure, 
whether of the person, property, or correspondence, or otherwise." 
86 Hosking v R1111ti11g , as above n 78, 41 l (HC) Randerson J; Rosemary Tobin "Privacy : one step forward , two 
steps back!" (2003) NZLJ 256,257. 
87 John F Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media Law in New Zealand (5ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) 
173. 
88 Rosemary Tobin "Invasion of Privacy" [2000] NZLJ 216. 
14 
terminology "general right to one's personality" might actually be somewhat broader than 
"privacy", but does not necessarily suggest that it regulates different scopes of law. 
It seems the approach taken to develop a general right to one's personality or pnvacy 
protection is similar in German and New Zealand law. Most of the aspects of the German 
general right to one's personality have been developed by courts. They are not, as one might 
think, codified in statutes or the German Civil Code.89 Similarly, as to date, it seems that the 
decisive step in New Zealand to develop a tort of privacy has already been taken by the courts. 
At this point, similarities however end. The difference of the historical and constitutional 
background of the two countries is apparent. The development of the general right to one's 
personality under German law was a compulsory result of German history - especially the 3rd 
Reich and the occurring grave violations of human rights - and the fundamental rights 
provided by the German Constitution. The Constitution acknowledges that privacy is a 
necessary part of, and its protection derived from, human personality and dignity. It may be 
stated that fundamental rights and hence privacy protection are inherent in the human 
personality. Contrary, there is no constitutional basis in New Zealand that provides for the 
protection of fundamental rights. As the BORA is an ordinary statute and, as such, as section 
4 provides,90 does not override any other statute, the courts are free to decide whether they 
will grant such protection to individuals. Reference to other common law countries illustrates 
the importance and impact of fundamental rights for the development of privacy protection. 
Privacy protection in New Zealand will therefore not be derived from, but granted to, the 
human being. In this respect, the New Zealand position is similar to the situation in Germany 
before the enactment of the German Constitution. Nevertheless, as for example seen in Police 
v Begg/1 and also in Lange92 irrespective of its status the BORA has had impact on the 
development of the right to freedom of expression in New Zealand. 
89 An important exception is of course the privilege as to the own picture. 
90 Section 4 of the Bill of Rights provides that: No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or 
made before or after the commencement of this Bill of Rights) (a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be 
impliedly repealed or revoked, or to be in any way invalid or ineffective; or (b) Decline to apply any provision of 
the enactment by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of Rights. 
91 Police v Beggs [1999] 3 NZLR 615. 
92 Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385. 
15 
VI SINGLE ASPECTS OF THE GENERAL RIGHT TO ONE'S PERSONALITY -
GERMAN LAW 
German courts have worked out a non-exhaustive catalogue of different aspects of the general 
right to one's personality. Those will be described and compared to relevant New Zealand 
laws, first to one action that might evolve in New Zealand and directly protect privac/3 and 
then to traditional remedies which incidentally provide for privacy protection in some 
respects. 94 
The discussion will focus on three main points of comparison: first, it will be asked to which 
extent a relevant law is capable of protecting privacy. Secondly, the means by which this 
protection can be infringed shall be described. And thirdly, reference shall be made to 
relevant justifications and defences for the infringements. 
A Privacy 
The first aspects of the German general right to one's personality that the FCC mentioned in 
its account in the Eppler-decision 95 are the intimate sphere, the personal sphere and the 
confidential sphere. These three spheres in some way form the core and foundation of the 
general right to one's personality and can be, taken together, referred to by using the word 
privacy. They decide in which situations and to what extent an individual enjoys privacy 
protection. In some cases, they interact and have to be applied together with other aspects of 
the general right to one's personality. If for example a newspaper wants to publish a portrait 
of an individual , the lawfulness of that publication will have to be assessed against the 
principles of the privilege as to the own picture.96 In deciding this question, it has to be asked 
in tum whether the portrait has been taken from the individual's intimate, personal or 
confidential sphere. 
93 The tort of invasion of privacy. 
94 For example defamation law and breach of confidence. 
95 B verfG 30 as above n 29, 2071. 
96 See below. 
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1 intimate sphere 
The intimate sphere of a person relates to the most intimate scope of his personality. Its 
protection is necessary for the development of the individuality which has to be shielded from 
the public in some respects.97 All aspects of the sexuality - images, statements and citations -
fall within the protection of the intimate sphere. It is prohibited to make or publish nude 
pictures without the consent of the person affected and it is irrelevant if the person is 
recognisable or not.98 In one decision,99 a picture of a dressed woman was printed next to an 
article about the awaking sexuality in spring. The heading of this article stated that it was time 
to have a "quickie" again. The court held that the woman's intimate sphere had been infringed 
because it had been - in a misleading way - suggested that the woman would live up her 
sexuality unrestrained. 
The protection of the intimate sphere is not confined to the domestic home. In the decision 
Telef onsex, 100 a man had telephone sex with his wife in his office. The FCJ held that an article 
in a newspaper about this conduct infringed the man ' s intimate sphere even though he made 
the phone calls from his office. Furthermore, every person is protected against statements 
others make about his sexuality, for example about his intimate rel ation to another person. In 
a case before the district court of Hamburg, a newspaper reported about a pregnant model. It 
printed images of six men and speculated in the article on who was the father. The court held 
that this article was an infringement of the woman ' s intimate sphere.101 
The protection of the intimate sphere does not cease because the person affected has not 
observed secrecy. Hence, a person taking a sunbath naked in a public park does not loose the 
protection of his intimate sphere. 102 And even if a person consents to the revelation of his 
intimate sphere in some aspects, he will not be deprived of the protection in general. In the 
97 BGH Der A11fi11acher II [1981) NJW 1366. 
98 BGH Nacktaufnahme [ 1985) NJW 1617. 
99 OLG-Hamburg [ 1995) ZUM 637, 639. 
JOO BGH Telefonsex im Biiro [1988] NJW 1984, 1985; The actual deci sion was more complicated than thi s 
summary suggests. The man actually had been dismissed by hi s employer because of the te lefon-sex and brought 
a c laim against hi s di smissal before a labour court. The newspaper artic le reported about the court proceedings. 
The BGH however still held that it infringed the man's intimate sphere - the in formation the man had given to 
the court was not supposed to be given to the public . 
101 Prinz, Peters, as above n 31 , 70. 
102 Prinz, Peters, as above n 31 , 72. 
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Pomodarsteller-decision, 103 it was held that a porn-actor does not waive his intimate sphere 
in general because he acts in porn-movies. 
As described, the intimate sphere protects against publication and observation of all intimate 
acts without consent. 104 It is further necessary for the development of the individual that his 
intimate sphere is protected against intrusions. Every person thus has a right to be spared from 
comments as to intimate acts he does not want to hear and a right to be protected against other 
stalking acts. The protection of the intimate sphere is absolute. This means that a violation can 
never be justified on the grounds of prevailing public interests. 105 Referring to the German 
Constitution, the protection of the general right to one's personality, Articles 1 I and 2 I of the 
Constitution will always and absolutely - without a balance of interests - prevail against other 
values such as the freedom of speech or press. 106 
2 Personal sphere 
The personal sphere protects an autonomous scope in which the individual can develop and 
live up his personality with the exclusion of other persons. In Caroline van Monaco III, 107 the 
FCJ talked of a right to be oneself, to belong to oneself. It is the sector of privacy to which 
other persons only have access as far as the person concerned allows it. 108 The courts have 
divided the personal sphere into a domestic sphere, a protected spatial sphere outside the 
domestic sphere and a non-spatial sphere. The personal sphere always has to be balanced 
against competing constitutional interests as it is not absolute. 
(a) Scope of protection 
The domestic home constitutes the classical area protected, regardless of whether the person 
affected has rented the location or owns the property. The individual is protected from 
intrusions by other persons and enjoys the freedom to develop his personality without being 
watched or criticised by the public. 109 They have the right to determine whether others have 
access to their domestic sphere or whether information about this sphere can be published. It 
103 LG Berlin Pornodarsteller [ 1997] NJW 1155. 
104 Prinz, Peters, as above n 31, 68, 69. 
105 Prinz, Peters, as above n 31, 68, 69. 
106 Article 5 of the Constitution. 
107 BGH Caroline von Monaco Ill, as above n 27, 1129. 
108 Prinz, Peters, as above n 31. 73. 
109 Prinz, Peters, as above n 31, 73. 
18 
is therefore unlawful to photograph and publish the interior of a flat without consent of the 
possessors because they have the right to determine whether and to what extent their personal 
sphere can be reproduced by another person.110 The domestic sphere further comprises the 
garden, balcony, offices and business premises. Therefore, it is unlawful to photograph a 
person sitting in his garden (not necessarily involved in a private act) with a telephoto lens. 111 
It is irrelevant whether coverage about the personal sphere is in pictures or in writing. In a 
case before the district court of Hamburg, a magazine reported about the interior of a house of 
a TV presenter. It gave an exact description in words of the bathroom, living room and the 
furniture. The court held that this coverage was unlawful. 112 
In Caroline, 11 3 the FCJ held that protection of the personal sphere is not confined to the 
domestic sector and protected a spatial sphere outside the domestic sphere if several 
conditions are fulfilled. These are that someone: 
• has retreated into local seclusion, 
• wants in an objectively recognisable way to be alone and 
• behaves, trusting in the seclusion, in a way he would not behave in the public. 
In this case photographs of Caroline who had retreated with a man in a barely lit restaurant, 
were taken and published. The court held that, since the princess and her companion in their 
seclusion no longer appeared to be part of the public and their dinner had an actual "private" 
character, the photographs taken were an infringement of their personal sphere and hence 
unlawful. The protection of privacy in this case prevailed against the public interest of a 
coverage about this dinner and the freedom of press. However, this balance of interests has to 
be conducted in every single case and even minor deviations can lead to a different result. In 
other decisions, the FCJ found in favour of the press where, for example, it had published 
images of the princess that showed her when horse-riding, shopping or cycling. Other courts, 
again, held that a lonely beach, a hotel or a sauna can fall within the scope of protected spatial 
sphere outside the domestic sphere. 114 The European Court of Human Rights took a much 
110 OLG DUsseldorf [ 1994] NJW 197 l. 
111 
LG Hamburg, Urteil vom 27.9.1996 - 324 0 392/96 (unpublished). 
11 2 See Prinz, Peters, as above n 31, 74. 
11 3 BGH Caroline von Monaco Ill , as above n 27, 1130. 
114 Examples see Prinz, Peters , as above n 31, 76. 
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wider approach when it stated in the case of van Hannover v Germanylf5 that even scenes 
from the daily life thus engaged in activities of a purely private nature such as practising sport, 
out walkjng, leaving a restaurant or on holiday can have private character and therefore fall 
within the scope of protection of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
(b) Balance of interests 
In contrast to the intimate sphere, the protection of a person's personal sphere is not 
absolute. 116 It has to be balanced with other constitutionally guaranteed rights, especially the 
freedom of press and speech and the interest of the public in information. 117 Since the 
opposing rights mentioned are vested with equal value by the Constitution, the balance of 
interests has to be conducted differently and might have a unique result in every case, takjng 
into account the special circumstances of that case. Reference can be made to the above 
description of the Lebach-decision. 
As a guideline, it can be asked if the public has a real interest in the information about the 
privacy or if there is a prevailing element of sheer entertainment, curiosity or sensation 
seekjng. In the latter case, the protection of the individual's personality will always prevail. 11 8 
An example for a prevailing public interest in information is the Sittenrichter-decision 119 of 
the FCJ. In this case, a man wrote about other persons, accusing them of behaviour that 
infringed morals and morality. However, he had been committing adultery for several years 
himself. A newspaper reported about this case. The court held that the coverage was lawful 
and stated that the man had to comply with the standards he applied to other persons. Hence, 
the interest of the public to information prevailed against the man's privacy right. 
3 Confidential sphere 
The confidential sphere protects communications and documentations. It protects the secrecy 
of for example telephone calls, 120 diaries 121 or medical certificates.122 Its scope often overlaps 
11 5 European Court of Human Rights Case of van Hannover v Germany (Application no. 59320/00) 24. Juni 
2004 para 50ff. 
116 BGHNotfalldienstarzt[l99l]NJW 1532, 1533. 
117 BGH Der A11fi11acher, as above n 97, 1367; BverfG Lebach, as above n 42, 1228. 
11 8 BGH Caroline van Monaco Ill, as above n 27, 1130. 
119 BGH Sittenrichter [ 1964] NJW 1471, 1472. 
120 BGH Kohl/Biedenkopf[ I 979] NJW 647. 
121 BGHZ 15,249,257. 
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with the intimate and personal sphere. The protection of the confidential sphere is not 
absolute and it has to be balanced with other constitutional values. In this respect, the same 
principles as in relation to the personal sphere apply. 123 
B Privilege as to the own picture 
In 1907 the AAC, that prohibits the publication of a person's picture without his consent, was 
enacted. 124 Nevertheless, in 1956 for the first time the FCJ passed ajudgment on the privilege 
as to the own picture based on the AAC. 125 In this case, a motorbike producer created an 
advertisement with the image of the actor Paul Dahlke without his consent. The actor could 
successfully claim for the amount of money the company would have had to pay for a licence 
to use the picture. Since then, the importance of the privilege as to the own picture has been 
d b h · d · · 126 stresse y t e courts m many ec1s10ns. 
The privilege as to the own picture confers the right on individuals to decide if pictures of 
them are made and published. A making or publication without consent is only lawful if other 
constitutional values prevail. This right is regulated in § 22 of the AAC and also a part of the 
general right to one's personality. § 22 of the AAC comprises the publication of images and, 
as statutory law, is Lex specialis to the general right to one ' s personality. However, as § 22 of 
the AAC explicitly states, it applies only to the publication and not to the making of images. 
Hence, in assessing the legality of the making of images, one has to refer to the general right 
to one's personality. This distinction has practical consequences and is not only of theoretical 
value: the protection provided for by the AAC is broader than the protection of the general 
right to one's personality. Furthermore, § 22 of the AAC only applies to images on which a 
person is recognisable. If this is not the case, a person can still refer to the protection of the 
I . h ' 1· 127 genera ng t to one s persona 1ty. 
122 BGH Kassenpapiere [ 1957] NJW 1146, 1147. 
123 BGH Kohl/Biedenkopf, as above n 120,647. 
124 Markesinis, as above n 32, 64, 65. 
125 BGH (1956] NJW 1554. 
126 For example BGH Spielgefahrtin [1965] NJW 2148; BGH Fuj3ballkalender [1979] NJW 2203 ; BGH 
Nacktauf11ah111e, as above n 98, 1617; BGH Caroline von Monaco Ill, as above n 27, 1128. 
127 Prinz, Peters, as above n 31 , 67, 68. 
1 The making of images of persons 
An individual is protected by his general right of personality against the making of pictures.128 
The courts have developed several groups of cases in which the making of images is held to 
be lawful or unlawful. 
It will generally be lawful to make an image for the purpose of giving evidence to assert one's 
legal interests. This interest, balanced against the personality right of the person affected, will 
mostly prevail against the interest of the privilege as to the own picture 129 because an image 
taken for the purpose of evidence will generally be provided to a court and is not aimed to be 
made available to the public. Thus, the personality right of the person will not be affected as 
much as if the image was published. For example, the district court Hamburg held that it was 
lawful to make a picture of an employee who had told his employer that he was sick, in a 
shopping mall if that picture was aimed to serve as evidence in a labour law process. 130 
However, the personality right of the portrayed person might still prevail. In its 
Videoaufzeichnuni-decision , 13 1 the FCJ held that it was unlawful to permanently record a 
public way to a private property and the people who entered that property on video, because 
the neighbour wanted to prove that those portrayed were tossing rubbish on his grounds. It is 
further lawful to make an image of a person if that image would be permissible according to § 
23 of the AAC or if the persons affected consents to the picture. 
On the other hand, it is generally unlawful to secretly make photographs in another person ' s 
personal sphere if the person affected is not aware of the picture. In these cases, the general 
right to one's personality will generally prevail against other values protected by the German 
Constitution. In its Vor unserer eigenen Tur-decision, 132 the FCJ held that it was unlawful to 
photograph a person (who was not aware of the photographer) at his entrance door even 
though the picture was intended to illustrate a newspaperstory about the person affected. It is 
further irrelevant whether or not the photographer himself has entered into the personal sphere 
of the person affected or makes the picture from a distance. 133 
128 Prinz, Peters. as above n 3 1, 534. 
129 OLG Schleswig 11980] NJW 325. 
130 OLG Hamburg [ 19911 AfP 473 . 
131 BGH Videoa11f:.eic/1111111g [1995] ZUM719, 721 . 
132 BGH Vor 1111serer eigenen Tiir [ 1966] NJW 2353 , 2354. 
133 There are special laws concerning the making of images of demonstrations , court proceedings and military 
institutions. An exact description of these legal issues would go beyond the scope of this paper. 
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2 The Act on Artistic Creations 
(a) The publication of portraits of persons 
The AAC only regulates the privilege as to the own picture and does not provide for any rules 
as to the property right in the film and images. This means that the photographer might well 
be the lawful proprietor of a film with an image of a person. However, he might not be in the 
legal position to also use and publish that image. This latter question has to be assessed on the 
basis of the AAC. 134 In assessing whether the publication of a portrait is permissible, one has 
to ask whether the person affected is recognisable, whether his portrait has actually been 
published, whether he has given the consent to the publication and, if not, whether his portrait 
,r could have been published. -) 
The term "portrait" has a broad meaning. As the legal history of the AAC shows, the picture 
of a dead body falls within its scope. A portrait comprises all forms of representation of 
individuals such as photographs, photomontages, drawings, caricatures or illustrations on 
coins as long as the individual is recognisable. This question does not necessarily need to be 
answered solely regarding the facial features of the person portrayed. Other circumstances can 
be taken into account. In its Fuj3balltorwart-decision, 136 the FCJ held that a goalkeeper of a 
football team was identifiable on a picture because of his haircut, body and football jersey 
even though his face could not be seen. The court also found that it would be enough to 
identify a person if his name is mentioned in the subtitle to a picture. It is not necessary that 
the person on the picture has actually been recognised by another person. It suffices if he 
gives reasons to believe that he could potentially be recognised by another person. 137 
The protection of the privilege as to the own image only applies if the portrait has actually 
been published. According to § 22 of the AAC, publication either means dissemination or 
exhibition of the portrait. In order to disseminate the portrait, it will be necessary that the 
maker places the portrait at the disposal of third parties, for example, by printing it in a 
newspaper or publishing it on a Internet site. It will further suffice for a publication if the 
134 Prinz, Peters, as above n 31 , 544. 
135 According to§ 23 or§ 24 of the AAC. 
136 BGH Fuflballtorwarr [ 1979] NJW 2205. 
137 BGH F11j3balltorwart, as above n 136, 2205. 
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maker shows the picture to a third party without disposing of the control over it, for example 
the portrait is broadcast or the maker shows it to friends. 
(b) Freedom of publication 
§ 23 of the AAC provides - subject to the balance of interests in § 23 II of the AAC - for 
exceptions to the general rule that a person's portrait can only be published with his consent. 
§ 23 I number 1 of the AAC provides for freedom of publication if a portrait 1s of 
contemporary history. It applies if the public, due to special circumstances of contemporary 
history, has a justified interest in a pictorial representation of a person. Those circumstances 
can be all occurrences of contemporary history without limitation to for example political 
issues. The term "portrait of contemporary history" is defined as a picture that shows a 
"personality of contemporary history". In interpreting the term "contemporary history", the 
FCJ has worked out a differentiation between persons who are "relatively a personality of 
contemporary history" and persons that are "absolutely a personality of contemporary 
history". 138 
A person who is absolutely a personality of contemporary history is a person who, due to his 
or her office, achievements or pe1iormances, is in the focus of the public eye and has an 
outstanding importance for the public life. Because of this status, the public has a legitimate 
interest in participating in the persons life and thus in a pictorial portrait of that person. The 
outstanding position must result from the significance of the person him or herself; a special 
interest of the media in a particular person will not render that person absolutely a personality 
of contemporary history. 139 Examples from the courts' jurisprudence for persons who are 
absolutely a personality of contemporary history are sportsmen, for example soccer player 
Franz Beckenbauer140 or tennis player Bo1is Becker, 141 musicians, for example Bob Dylan, 142 
politicians, for example German Chancellor Willy Brandt 143 and other prominent persons, for 
example Princess Caroline of Monaco. 144 Such persons must generally put up with a 
138 Prinz, Peters, as above n 31,565. 
139 BGH Wiederholungsveroffentlichung (1996] NJW 985. 986 ; BGH Caroline von Monaco Ill, as above n 27, 
1129. 
1
~
0 BGH Fuftbalfkalender, as above n 126, 2203 . 
141 OLG Frankfurt [ 1989] NJW 402. 
142 BGH Bob Dylan (1997] NJW 1152. 
143 BGH Abschiedsmedaille (19961 GRUR 195. 
144 BGH Caroline von Monaco Ill, as above n 27 , 1129. 
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publication of their portrait, even if the portrait concerns aspects of their personal sphere. 145 
They thus generally have to accept the publication of portraits that show them in a cafe, 
restaurant or at sports. 146 
On the other hand, "relatively a personality of contemporary history" means a person who is 
in the public eye not by virtue of his office or achievements but because of a connection to an 
occurrence of contemporary history that the public has a legitimate interest in. It is only 
permissible to publish portraits of a person who is a "relatively a personality of contemporary 
history" taken in the context of the occurrence of contemporary history. 147 If a person helps 
another person who has been injured in a car accident, the portrait published may only show 
the person in the actual act of help. It would not be permissible to publish a picture of the 
helping person that has been made in another context. 148 Examples of people who are 
relatively a personality of contemporary history are soccer players from the German 
Bundesliga. I.J 9 (Suspected) criminal offenders can be relatively persons of contemporary 
history. It affects the core of the personality if a person is described as a (suspected) offender. 
This aspect has to be fairly balanced against the freedom of the press in every single case, 
since it is the press's task to also inform about criminal proceedings. 150 Spouses of persons of 
contemporary history are relatively personalities of contemporary history themselves if they 
appear in public with the person of contemporary history. 151 
§ 23 II of the AAC, again, provides for a balance of interests. This provision emphasises that 
publications of portraits of persons of contemporary history have to be assessed against the 
constitutional background of the AAC. In constitutional terms, there is a presumption that the 
publication is lawful and freedom of press will prevail against the privilege as to the own 
picture if a person is of contemporary history. The publication can however still be unlawful 
and the personality rights of that person prevail against other constitutional values in special 
circumstances. Publications of portraits of the intimate sphere of a person are, irrespective 
whether that person is absolutely or relatively a personality of contemporary history, without 
exceptions unlawful. 152 Further, even someone who is absolutely a personality of 
145 BGH Bob Dylan , as above n 136, 1152. 
146 BGH Caroline von Monaco Ill, as above n 27, 1129. 
147 BGH Spielgefcihrtin, as above n 118, 2149. 
148 Prinz, Peters, as above n 31, 572. 
149 BGH Ligaspieler [1968] NJW 1091. 
150 BverfG Lebach, as above n 42, 1227. 
151 OLG Hamburg [1991) AtP 437. 
152 BGH Nacktaufnahme, as above n 98, 1618. 
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contemporary history can rely on the protection of his personal sphere in special 
circumstances and does not, in this characteristic, lose the protection of the personal sphere. 
In Caroline, 153 it was held that people, whether absolutely a personality of contemporary 
history or not, have an inherent right to be themself and to belong to themself. This right can 
in special circumstances outweigh the freedom of the press. 
Finally, a publisher cannot rely on the freedom of publication if the publication does not serve 
freedom of press and the public interest in information and instead serves only his own 
business interests . It is often difficult to distinguish between these interests - a newspaper, for 
example, is published because the publisher wants to inform the public as well as he wants to 
receive remuneration . The test applied is that a publisher cannot rely on the freedom to 
publish if the publication merely serves his economic or business interests .154 Examples of 
mere economic interest are portraits used in a publicity brochure 155 or in a newspaper 
advertisement. 156 As an exception to this rule, the FCJ held that advertisements for 
newspapers, journals and books can be placed with a portrait of a person without his consent. 
The constitutionally protected freedom of press also provides for a protection of the publicity 
for these materials. 157 Further, it is unlawful to sell a portrait of another person if that picture 
is the actual object of the purchase.158 A similar situation occurs if the portrait of a person is 
used on merchandising products. In its Nena-decision, 159 the FCJ held that it was unlawful to 
sell products with a portrait of pop star Nena without her consent. 
To sum up, in German law publication of an image of another person without his or her 
consent for commercial purposes will never be covered by freedom of publication, 160 whether 
that person has a commercially saleable reputation or not. Freedom of publication refers to 
interests of the public in contemporary history. The commercial use of a photograph will not 
be able to satisfy such an interest. 
As a further exception to the general rule that the publication of a person ' s portrait is only 
permissible with his consent, § 23 I number 2 of the AAC provides that a person ' s image can 
153 BGH Ca rolin e van Monaco Ill, as above n 27 , 1129. 
154 BGH Abschieds111 edaille (19961 NJW 593 , 595 . 
155 AG Frankfurt 11 996] NJW 53 I. 
156 BGH Talkma ster [ 1992] NJW 2084. 
157 BGH Fu/3ballkale11der, as above n 126, 2204. 
158 BGH Ligaspieler, as above n 149, 109 I. 
159 BGH Nena [ 19871 GRUR 128. 
160 With the exception of advertisements for the press. 
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also be published if the focus on the picture is not on the person, but on the landscape or 
locality around. The test is whether the aim of the picture taken is to record the landscape or 
locality and whether the person just happens to be on the picture. The landscape or locality 
must have a formative influence on the picture. 161 § 23 I number 3 of the AAC provides that 
pictures of assemblies , gatherings and other meetings may be taken without the consent of the 
participants. The reason for this exception is that the public interest in information about these 
assemblies will generally prevail against the personality rights of the persons affected. 
VII PRIVACY PROTECTION IN NEW ZEALAND 
A Evolving form of action - The tort of invasion of privacy 
1 Scope of protection 
In Hosking the majority of the judges decided in favour of a tort of privacy. In this case 
Hosking and his wife applied for an injunction to prevent a magazine from publishing photos 
of their twin daughters being pushed in their stroller by Mrs Hosking as she walked down a 
public street. Gault and Blanchard JJ set out two fundamental requirements which have to be 
satisfied for a successful claim for interference with privacy: 162 
• The existence of facts in respect of which there was a reasonable 
expectation of privacy; and 
• Publicity given to those facts that would be considered highly offensive to 
an objective reasonable person. 
Additionally, as a defence the nature and extent of legitimate public interest in having the 
information disclosed is relevant. 
Nevertheless, Gault and Blanchard JJ also stated that "[t]here is no simple test for what 
constitutes a private fact", but in many cases the test will be analogous to the 'private fact' 
test employed in the established action of breach of confidence. 163 Tipping J held, that there 
must be a reasonable expectation of p1ivacy arising from the nature of the information or 
161 BGH Familie Schblermann [ 1961] NJW 558 . 
162 Hosking v Runting, above n 16, 2 Gault an Blanchard JJ . 
163 Hosking v R1111ti11g, above n 16, 32 Gault and Blanchard JJ . 
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material itself or the circumstances in which the information where gathered, or both. 164 In 
defining the scope of protection more precisely the court referred to Gleeson CJ in Lenah who 
stated that there is no bright line between what is private and what is public: 165 
Certain kinds of information about a person, such as information relating to health, 
personal relationships, or finances, may be easy to identify as private; as may certain 
kinds of activity, which a reasonable person, applying contemporary standards of morals 
and behaviour, would understand to be meant to be unobserved. The requirement that 
disclosure or observation of information or conduct which would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities is in many circumstances a useful practical test 
of what is private." 
A man in his underpants in his bedroom could serve as an example for what could be 
considered as private. 166 Lenah's activities 167 , on the other hand, were not private in that sense 
and were concerned more with the protection of its commercial interests in business 
goodwill. 168 Therefore, it did not have a cause of action. 
The court in Lenah also stated that in deciding whether an act is private or not, one has to bear 
in mind that privacy is "a legal principle drawn from the fundamental value of personal 
autonomy". 169 The foundation of much of what is protected is human dignity. 170 Therefore, 
private is something m the nature of the information itself that its disclosure would be 
considered offensive to others. Especially intimate and sensitive information fulfils this 
criterion. 171 With regard to covert filming the court in Hosking noted the hurt or harm that 
could be caused by wide publicity of intimate, private information and stated that "[t]he 
intrusiveness of the long-range lens [ ... ] and the willingness to pay for and publish the 
164 Hosking v Runting, above n 16, 60 Tipping J. 
165 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001) HCA 63 para 42. 
166 ABC v Lenah, as above n 165 para 54; This example is however clearly given in a breach of confidence-
context. 
167 Lenah was a company stunning, slaughtering and exporting possums to Asian countries. Unknown persons 
trespassed on the company's premises where they positioned video cameras that recorded the work in the factory . 
A video tape was processed to the ABC which intended to broadcast it. Lenah applied for an interlocutory 
injunction to prevent the broadcast which was granted by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania in an 
appeal. The High Court allowed an appeal by the ABC and dismissed the decision of the Full Court. One issue in 
question was whether Lenah could rely on protection of privacy in order to obtain the injunction. 
168 ABC v Lenah, as above n 165 para 54; David Lindsay "Protection of privacy under the general law following 
ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd: where to now?" (2002) 9 Privacy Law & Policy Reporter 101, 105. 
169 ABC v Lenah, as above n 165 para 54 para. 125. 
170 ABC v Lenah, as above n 165 para 54 para. 43. 
171 New Zealand Law Commission Intimate Covert Filming [2004] Study Paper 15, 22. 
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salacious are factors in modem society of which the law must take account." 172 In Bathhurst 
the court held that it would be possible to give relief to someone photographed in a 
shockingly condition or a women "standing innocently over the air vent in a fun house and 
someone had photographed her with her skirts blown up." 173 
In Tucker the court asserted that public facts can, over time, become private ones. 174 This is 
also suggested in principle (ii) of the Broadcasting Standards Authority (BSA) privacy 
principles. 175 Nevertheless the requirement for private facts makes it difficult to establish 
actions in a public area that might result in an intrusion of privacy. The BSA in several 
decisions 176 decided that conventional filming and photographing in public places does not 
usually invade private facts. Nevertheless, exceptions to this general rule are involuntary and 
intimate situations that occur in public places. They still can remain private. In this respect the 
court in Bradle/77 held that the mere fact that something took place in a public area does not 
automatically mean that it can be widely publicised especially if it was no matter of public 
concern. 
With respect to public disclosure the BSA has required in several decisions that a person is 
identifiable not only by a limited number of people such as family and close friends. 178 
To adjust what is offensive to the societal norms which prevail at the time of the action the 
court stated that "the concern is with publicity that is truly humiliating and distressful or 
otherwise harmful to the individual concerned [ ... ]determined objectively, by reference to its 
extent and nature, to be offensive by causing real hurt or harm." 179 Tipping J disagreed with 
172 Hosking v Ru11ti11g, above n 16, 30 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
173 Bathhurst City Council v Saban (1985) 2 NSWLR 708. Also the English court in Hellewell v Chief Constable 
of Derbyshire [1995] 4 All ER 473 stated that "[i]f someone with a telephoto lens were to take from a distance 
and with no authority a picture of another engaged in some private act, his subsequent disclosure of the 
photograph would amount to a breach of privacy. This example was clearly given in a breach of confidence-
context. 
174 Tucker v News Media, as above n 57, 716. 
175 Principle (ii) of the BSA privacy principles states: The protection of privacy also protects against the public 
disclosure of some kinds of public facts. The "public" facts contemplated concern events (such as criminal 
behaviour) which have, in effect, become private again , for example through the passage of time. Nevertheless, 
the public disclosure of public facts will have to be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 
176 See Burrows, as above n 87, 259. 
177 Bradley v Wing1111t Films Ltd [1993) l NZLR 415,424. 
178 See Burrows, as above n 87,261. 
179 Hosking v R1111ting, above n 16, 34 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
29 
the rest of the majority and stated that a lesser substantial level of offensiveness would suffice 
as opposed to a high level. 180 
Furthermore a defence based on public interest was identified by the court as they held that a 
publication is justified when there is legitimate public concern in the matter. 181 This defence 
may exist if the plaintiff is a public figure or if information is in the field of public health, 
economy, or safety, the detection of crime, or national security generally is concerned. 182 
Nonetheless , the court also considered that public figures "may also experience a lessening of 
expectations of privacy, but not ordinarily to the extent of those who willingly put themselves 
in the spotlight." 183 Such a defence will not apply to publications for merely prurient 
interest. 184 Distinguishing matters of legitimate concern from those of general interest and 
curiosity the court held: 
"The line is to be drawn when publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is 
entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with which a 
reasonable member of the public, with decent standards would say that he had no concern." 185 
On the other hand, it has to be taken into account whether the person affected sought publicity 
or seclusion. 186 Privacy further will have to be balanced against other legal interests such as 
freedom of speech and other community norms, values and standards. 18
7 Those interests have 
to be acknowledged in every case and weighed against each other. 
Finally, there is an interim injunction available but the threshold has been set very high as 
there has to be "compelling evidence of most highly offensive intended publicising of private 
information and [ ... ] little legitimate public concern in the information." 188 Nevertheless, in 
most of the cases of intimate covert filming this threshold is likely to be crossed. 189 
180 Hosking v Runring. above n 16, 62 Tipping J. 
181 Hosking v Runting, above n 16, 35 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
182 Burrows, as above n 87, 255. 
183 Hosking v Runting , above n 16, 33 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
184 Hosking v R1111ting, above n 16, 36 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
185 Hosking v Runting. above n 16, 36 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
186 Lindsay. as above n 168, 107; Burrows, as above n 87,256. 
187 
Hosking" Runting , above n 16, 36 Gault P and Blanchard J; ABC v Lenah, above n 165 para 41. 
188 Hosking" Runting, above n 16 , 40 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
189 Law Commission, as above n 171 , 22. 
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C . 190 2 ompanson 
As in Germany, reasons given by the New Zealand judges for the need to recognise a right to 
privacy are the protection of human dignity and personal autonomy. Only the German legal 
system protects those values as legal rights. It seems to be likely that actions that fall within 
the German intimate sphere would be covered by a New Zealand right of privacy. For 
example, the publication of a nude picture, a telephone sex conversation or other aspects 
concerning a person's sexuality would, applying Judge Gleeson's principles, be activities 
"which a reasonable person, applying contemporary standards of morals and behaviour, 
would understand to be meant to be unobserved". Those situations are similar to the man in 
underpants in his bedroom described by Gleeson CJ. 
Although at first glance, the issue of privacy protection in New Zealand seems to be solved, 
there are still remaining questions. This is also indicated as the decision was passed by a 
narrow three-to-two vote. 191 
Firstly, difficult problems arise in relation to the application of the BORA. The BORA does 
not protect against an invasion of privacy itself, whereas in section 14 it does include a 
specific protection for freedom and speech. 192 With the new tort of invasion of privacy, the 
courts could decide cases in favour of privacy which is not even recognised by the BORA. 193 
Nevertheless, that privacy is not protected by the statutes as such, does not prevent the courts 
from developing a common Jaw action for invasion of privacy. However the Courts are faced 
with interpreting the scope and application of the BORA and the Privacy Act 1993. In 
Hosking the court held that the rights and freedoms in the BORA must "inform" 194 the 
development of common law and that the development is "not precluded merely because they 
190 In comparing the German and New Zealand position, it always has to be born in mind that, as described, 
much of the New Zealand privacy protection - if it exists or will exist at all - is still vague and will be shaped 
only in the following years. At this stage, the comparison will have to rely very much on assumptions and 
presumptions as to the decisions of the New Zealand judges in the described cases. 
191 Majority: Gault P, Blanchard J and Tipping J; Minority: Keith J and Anderson J. 
192 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. Section 14 includes the freedom to seek, receive. and impart 
information and opinions of any kind in any form. 
193 The Judges of the Court of Appeal were unanimous upon the deliberate omission of privacy within the BORA 
as well as within other statutes, though the interpretation of the reluctance differs. According to Tipping J, 
Parliament would have made the restriction clear if it wished a no-go area for the Courts. Keith J placed the 
opposite interpretation on the statutory background. From his point of view, Parliament deliberately excluded the 
news media from its scope in order not to combine the law with the recognition of a general tort preventing the 
public disclosure of private facts. This argument can be supported by the fact that the NZBORA places more 
emphasis on rights of freedom of expression in section 14. See Hosking v R1111ting , above n I 6, 26, 50, 5 l. 55. 
194 Hosking v R1111ti11g , above n 16, 55. 
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might encroach upon those rights and freedoms. It becomes a matter of whether such common 
law encroachment meets the test of a reasonable limit on the applicable right or freedom 
which is demonstrably justified in a democratic society ins 5." 195 
Secondly, other questions arise when considering the two requirements as conditions for a 
successful claim of interference of privacy. The first requirement is a "reasonable expectation 
of privacy". 196 It needs to be clarified whether these expectations rely on the past level of 
media intrusion or are independent of such a consideration. In this respect differences might 
arise in the protection of what is referred to as the domestic part of the personal sphere in 
Germany. Whereas the court in Hosking clearly refers to the people themself, their activities 
in the private sphere or their character, German law seems to take a broader approach , for 
example when it provides for protection against coverage (in pictures or writing) about the 
interior of a flat without the consent of its possessor. Further, it is unlikely that "normal" acts 
in the domestic sphere 197 will fall within the scope of privacy in New Zealand. Further, it is 
likely that those acts will not satisfy the "highly offensive" test. On the other hand, if the 
courts maintain using the BSA principles and decisions as a useful guidance to develop the 
scope of the tort it might be that the approach of privacy protection gets closer to the German 
approach. Especially in respect of (intimate) covert filming, intrusive filming and recording 
and any form of prying practice is covered by principle (iii) of the BSA. 198 Therefore, in 
several BSA decisions filming with a hidden camera and/or without knowledge of the 
complainant was held to breach privacy principle (iii), as well as the mere filming of an 
. d h . h h . . 199 unoccup1e ouse wit out t e owners perm1ss1on. 
As one of the second requirements, the publicity of the facts should be "highly offensive". 
What is meant by this still remains ambiguous. Tipping J prefers "the qualifier to be a 
substantial level of offence rather than a high level of offence". 200 This leads to future 
uncertainty and provides the future courts with a new task of interpretation. Furthermore it is 
not clear from which perspective the offensiveness test should be conducted. In P v D201 it 
was the view of a reasonable person apprised of all facts, in L v G202 it was a reasonable 
195 Hosking v Runting, above n 16, 31. 
196 Hosking v Runting , above n 16, I. 
197 For example the eating and living habits of an individual. 
198 Burrows, as above n 87,264. 
199 Burrows, as above n 87, 264,265 . 
200 Hosking v Runting, above n 16, 62 Tipping J. 
201 P v D , as above n 75,601 Nicholson J . 
202 L v G, as above n 77, 248 Judge Abbott. 
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person putting him or herself in the shoes of the plaintiff and m Hosking 203 it was the 
viewpoint of a reasonable plaintiff. 
Furthermore, contrary to Germany, as the court assumes the public disclosure of the private 
facts , situations where third persons gather offensive information to keep them for their own 
purposes rather than publishing them are not included in the tort. 204 
Furthermore, it is not clear whether the tort should provide redress for emotional distress only 
or whether damages to reputation should be included. In L v G the court held that any "loss of 
the personal shield of privacy" which affects one's individual dignity, integrity, freedom or 
independence constitutes an invasion of privacy irrespective of a relationship to issues of 
perception and identification by those members of the public to whom the information is 
disclosed. 205 The Court of Appeal in Hosking held that "the disclosure of the private facts 
must be a public disclosure, not a private one."206 This requires "that the matter must be 
communicated to the public at large, or to so many persons that it must be regarded as 
substantially certain to become one of public knowledge. An action will not succeed if the 
alleged disclosure was to only one or two people."207 
Further, it will be interesting to assess cases in which German law provides for privacy 
protection outside the domestic sphere when a person has retreated recognisably into local 
seclusion. In reading the judgment in Hosking, no indication can be found that these situations 
shall be excluded from privacy protection. It is argued that much of privacy protection is 
derived from human dignity and personal autonomy. These values will not cease once the 
domestic home is left. It might therefore well be that New Zealand law also acknowledges 
that seclusions that are worthy to protect can take place beyond the domestic sphere. 
This leads to the companson of the last part of the German personal sphere - private 
information taken from a "non-spatial" sphere. Some examples described above - for example. 
health , relationships or finances - are an exact match of the examples Gleeson CJ gives in his 
· d 208 JU gment. 
203 Hosking v R1111ti11g, above n 16, 35 Gault P. 
204 Andrew Geddis "Hosking v Runting: A privacy tort for New Zealand" (2005) 13 Tort L Rev 5, 8. 
205 L v G, as above n 77 , 246 Judge T M Abbott. 
206 Hosking v Runting, above n 16, 21 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
207 Hosking v Runting, above n 16, 21 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
208 See also Caldwell , as above n 22, 93. 
Even though German law prohibits all intrusion, coverage, discussion or other publication of 
intimate facts, it seems to be centred on the publication of private information. Following 
Hosking an New Zealand right of privacy will be likely to inhibit intrusions into privacy and 
the disclosure of private acts. The acknowledged methods by which these violations can be 
committed seem to be the same in both legal systems. Examples are photographs, publication 
in writing or physical intrusion into seclusion if publicised or private facts are concerned. 
A difference arises in another respect. As described, the protection of the intimate sphere is 
absolute in Germany. However, it seems that a defence based on the public interest and a 
balance against other interests209 might apply in all New Zealand privacy cases. In that respect, 
the indicated scope of New Zealand privacy protection seems to be more similar to the 
German personal sphere. The protection of the personal sphere always has to be balanced 
against other rights guaranteed by the German Constitution. This approach is more simnar to 
the indicated defence on the public interest and balance against other legal interests in New 
Zealand. 
Furthermore, New Zealand pnvacy law will protect individuals from unconsented 
publications of their portraits in a considerable number of cases in which the German 
privilege as to the own picture is applicable when the person portrayed is involved in a private 
act. It will be seen whether New Zealand privacy law will provide for the same broad 
protection as German law. There is a main difference between the German privilege as to the 
own picture and a New Zealand right of privacy. The decisive point in assessing the 
lawfulness of the publication of a picture in New Zealand seems to be whether the person in 
that picture is involved in a private act or not. Contrary, the German AAC - as a first step -
acknowledges that every person has the 1ight to decide whether a picture of his is to be 
published and that a publication is generally only lawful if he has consented. No element of 
privacy is necessary. Freedom of publication without consent exists only if one of the 
exceptions of§ 23 of the AAC is applicable.210 
To summaiise, it was shown that a comparison of German and New Zealand privacy law is 
partially based on assumptions. Whereas the German legal system has developed ptivacy 
protection in a period of about 50 years, there are hardly any authorities that can be found in 
209 For example freedom of speech. 
2 10 Whether the exceptions stated there and interpreted by the courts will , in similar ways , be established in New 
Zealand - for example based on a public interest defence or freedom to political expression - has to be seen. 
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New Zealand law. Consequently, the German system of privacy protection is much more 
complex than the New Zealand. Further, the balance of different interests has often been 
exercised by German courts. It will be more difficult to conduct thi s balance of interests in 
New Zealand because there are no binding constitutional values as in Germany that can serve 
as a guideline. Cooper J in Andrews stated that "as the tort develops, numerous issues will 
arise and need to be resolved in accordance with policy, and just outcomes for particular 
factual circumstances."2 11 All this needs to be determined on the basis of facts determined by 
the courts as cases come to light. 
B Torts directly or indirectly related to privacy protection 
Breach of confidence has its origins in the UK and, over the years , has been developed there 
· 2 12 as a means to protect pnvacy. 
I Breach of confidence 
In New Zealand the courts have acknowledged the existence of a tort of privacy as it is "a 
more appropriate vehicle for redressing the publication of sensitive personal information" 
than breach of confidence2 13 From their point of view the remedy of breach of confidence is 
not applicable when an action solely is based on the publication of personal and private 
information without any confident relationship between the parties. Breach of confidence 
"require[s] an element of trust or something equivalent [ ... ] between the parties."2 14 Referring 
to the case Peck v UK215 Keith J was not prepared to recognise a confidential relationship or 
communication between the parties only because of the fact a private situation is 
photographed. Therefore it seems as if in New Zealand the law on breach of confidence is to 
be confined to cases where , for example in employment cases, one party to a relationship 
confides information to the other. 2 16 Nevertheless, as the scope of protection might be similar 
and the test what is private will be analogous to the 'private fact ' test employed in the 
2 11 Andrews v Television New Zealand Ltd HC AK CIV 2004-404-3536 [2005] para 2 1. 
2 12 See A v B [2003] QB 195,202; Attorney General v Guardian Newspaper (No 2) [ 1990] l AC 109; Hewell v 
Chief Constable of Derbyshire [ 1995] l WLR 804; Creation Records Ltd v News Group Newspapers Ltd [ 1997] 
EMLR 444, 453; see also Daniel Stewart "Protecting Privacy, Property, and Possums: Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd" (2002) Vol 30 Nol Fed Law Rev 177, 195; Richardson, as above n 
21, 382. 
2 13 Burrows, as above n 87, 215 . 
2 14 Hosking v R11nti11g, as above n 16, 49 Keith J. 
2 15 Peck v United Ki11gdo111 (2003) 36 Eur Court HR 41 , 719. 
2 16 Burrows, as above n 87,216; Law Commission, as above n 171, 45. 
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established action of breach of confidence, 217 the requirements of the tort are mentioned 
briefly. 
The elements of a breach of confidence are that there (1) must be information that has a 
necessary quality of confidence, (2) the information must have been imparted in 
circumstances importing an obligation of confidence and (3) there must be an unauthorised 
use of that information to the detriment of the party communicating it. 218 
Confidential information is such that is not public property and public knowledge219 whereas 
it does not need to be absolute secret. 220 
The information must further have been imparted in circumstances giving rise to an obligation 
of confidence between the parties. Traditionally, this condition was met if there was a 
confidential relationship or communication between the parties. 221 Such relationships can be 
personal, for example a relationship of marriage. 222 If third parties know about the 
confidential nature of the information, they will also be under an obligation of 
confidentiality. 223 The subsequent development, especially in the UK, shows that such 
obligations were further imposed constructively by the courts in equity - even where no 
confidential relationship between the parties existed - in two situations: first, an obligation 
was construed if information was obtained by improper means and, secondly, if the 
information had a private character. In Attorney General v Guardian Newspaper, 224 it was 
held that a duty of confidence can arise when confidential information comes to the 
knowledge of a person (that can also be a third party) in circumstances where he or she has 
notice that the information is confidential with the effect that it would be just to preclude him 
from disclosing the infotmation to others. In that respect, it will also suffice if the defendant 
can infer from the circumstances through which the personal information was obtained that 
the information is confidential , for example if the information was improperly or 
2 17 Hosking v Runting, above n 16, 32 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
218 Attorney-General, as above n 212, 109; Coco v AN Clark ( Engineers) Ltd (1969) RPC 41. 
2 19 For example in the public domain; see Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell (1948) 65 RPC 203,215. 
220 Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd l I 982) QB I, 28; Stewart, as above n 212, 194. 
22 1 Saltman Engineering, as above n 2 19,2 13. 
222 Argyll ( Dutchess) v Argyll ( Duke) [ 1967 J l Ch 302. 
223 Malone v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis ( No 2) [ 1979) l Ch 344, 361; Stewart, as above n 212, 
195. 
224 Hewell, as above n 212,809. 
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surreptitiously obtained. 225 In Hewell, 226 it was held that it amounts to a breach of confidence 
to take images of another engaged in a private act with a telephoto lens. In A v B, 227 it was 
held that a duty of confidence may arise whenever the defendant "either knows or ought to 
know that the other person can reasonably expect his privacy to be protected". 228 In such 
cases, the Jaw of the UK protects what could be called a right to privacy.229 
Finally, the use or disclosure of the personal information must be unauthorised.230 Importantly, 
every third party that receives information as a result of another's breach of confidence may 
be liable for using or disclosing it, or restrained from doing so, once the third party has actual 
or constructive notice of the breach. 231 
B Recognised forms of action 
1 Defamation law 
(a) Scope of protection 
The law of defamation seeks to protect individual reputation against unjustifiable attack and 
often involves a balance between competing demands as for example freedom of speech. 232 
The cause of action m defamation law is a defamatory statement, or, more precisely, a 
defamatory imputation. A defamatory imputation (by words, photographs, video, illustrations 
or other means) is one which is likely to injure the reputation of the plaintiff by exposing him 
to hatred, contempt or ridicule, 233 or which would tend to make the plaintiff shunned or 
avoided234 or which has the tendency to lower him in the estimation of others.235 Furthermore, 
225 Lord Ashburton v Pape [1913) 2 Ch 469,475; Franklin v Giddins [1978) Qc!R 72; Commonwealth v John 
Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 39 ; Creation Records Ltd v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997) EMLR 
444,453; see also Stewart, as above n 212, 195. 
226 Hewell, as above n 212,804. 
227 A vB, as above n 212,202. 
228 A vB, as above n 212,202; Hewell, as above n 212,804. 
229 A vB, as above n 212,202; Hewell, as above n 212, 804; see also Richardson, as above n 21,383. 
230 R v Department of Health; Ex parte Source Informatics Ltd [2001] QB 424: It is not clear whether detriment 
of the plaintiff is a necessary element of the action, see Caldwell, as above n 22, 112. 
23 1 Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408,460,474. 
232 Burrows, as above n 87 , 10. 
233 Parmiter v Coupland (1840) 6 M & W 105, 108. 
234 Morgan v Lingen (1863) 8 LT 800. 
235 Sim v Stretch [1936) 2 All ER 1237, 1240; The meaning of defamation has to be assessed from the view of an 
ordinary reasonable person, not being unusually suspicious or unusually naive. It can stem from the express 
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a defamation can only occur if the disparaging statement is made to someone other than the 
person defamed. This requirement is known as publication.236 
A number of cases decided under defamation law have tackled the question of privacy 
protection. Looking at these decisions someone has to bear in mind, that 
"the gist of the [tort of invasion of privacy], unlike defamation, is not injury to character 
or reputation, but to one 's feelings and peace of mind. The gravamen of the action is 
unwarranted publication of intimate details of the plaintiffs private life which are outside 
the realm of legitimate public concern, or curiosity."237 
In the English case Garbett,238 a photograph of the plaintiff was placed in a magazine next to 
the photograph of a nude woman. The court held that this arrangement raised an innuendo 
which lowered the plaintiff's reputation and was therefore defamatory. Also in the New 
Zealand case Taylor239 the defendant was sued for defamation for publishing a photograph of 
the plaintiff with one of her grand-daughters in a book that might be called largely a manual 
of sex instruction. Similarly in other cases publishers have been sued, or threatened with suit 
for the unthinking choice or placement of a photograph next to an article on an unsavoury 
topic.240 Nevertheless, in New Zealand as a general rule, the mere publication of pictures of 
I · · · . . d 241 . d f 
247 Al . K" ?43 h h ld peop em amusmg situations or att1tu es 1s not e amatory. - so m mg- t e court e , 
that the mere covert nature of filming and the so-called entrapment of the plaintiff were 
neither sufficient to support a duty of care in negligence nor defamatory.2
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Nevertehless, examples that are most significant in the privacy context like the Australian 
case Ettingshausen245 are rare. In this case pictures of the famous rugby player Ettingshausen 
naked under the shower were published. The court found that the mere publication of the 
statement itself or can "hide" behind an apparently innocent statement. Such a hidden, secondary meaning is 
generally known as an innuendo. Also a defamatory statement does not necessarily need to be false, see John G 
Fleming The Law of Torts 1998 (9ed The Law Book Company Limited, Sydney) 589; Burrows, as above n 87, 
37 ; Lewis and another v Daily Telegraph Ltd; Same v Associated Newspapers [1963] 2 All ER 151, 154. 
236 John G Fleming The Law of Torts 1998 (9ed The Law Book Company Limited Sydney) 593. 
237 L v G, as above n 77,241 TM Abbott J. 
238 Garbett v Ha zell, Watson and Viney [ 1943] All ER 359. 
239 Taylor v Beere [198211 NZLR 81. 
240 Burrows, as above n 87, 30. 
241 For example on the beach, at a sports event or in the street. 
242 Burrows, as above n 87, 19. 
w King v TV3 Network Services Ltd [20031 CA 221/02 at 11-14. 
244 However, the court held that it could have relevance to qualified privilege in the defamation area, King, as 
above n 230, 13. 
245 Ettingshausen v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd [1991] 23 NSWLR 443. 
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photograph was capable of subjecting the entirely blameless plaintiff to more than a trivial 
degree of ridicule and was therefore capable - without any moral blame - of defaming the 
plaintiff on this ground alone.246 
At common law there are several defences where the plaintiff will not succeed in a 
defamation action because the right to his reputation is less important than the right of other 
persons to speak their mind or to convey information. 
Firstly, there is a defence of truth. 247 Nevertheless, as a camera footage is not used in a 
misleading way defamation is not going to occur at the stage of taking pictures as things 
caught on a film are usually true. Nevertheless, true statements that are not defamatory are 
actionable under the tort of privacy if they relate to private matters that make it offensive to 
publish them.248 
Furthermore a qualified privilege exists when "an occas10n where the person who makes a 
communication has an interest or a duty, legal , social or moral , to make it to the person to 
whom it is made, and the person to whom it is made has a corresponding interest or duty to 
receive it." 249 This requirement is actually designed for the protection of privacy and not 
reputation and a reason why the law of defamation can operate as privacy law in certain 
circumstances but not in the case of covert filming. 250 
246 Ettingshausen, as above n 245, 449; The court stated that "there is a shape between the plaintiff's legs which 
[ ... ] is certainly capable of being interpreted as his penis". Therefore, a defamatory meaning of this publication 
could be established on two grounds. One was the imputation that the photograph suggested that Ettingshausen 
was a person who gave his consent to the taking and publication of a photograph of him naked under the shower. 
Considering especially his position as a coach for young rugby players, he could be morally blamed for 
consenting to such a photograph. Hunt J, after considering whether the photograph conveyed such an imputation, 
left the question open and decided that the issue was one for the jury. However, he found for Ettingshausen on 
another ground, see Ettingshausen, as above n 245, 444. 
247 This defence was known as justification and was renamed under section 8 ( 1) of the Defamation Act as truth . 
It is applicable where the proceedings are based on all or any of the matter contained in a publication and the 
defendant proves that the publication taken as a whole was in substance true or was in substance not materially 
different from the truth . Additionally the defence of truth will succeed if the imputations published were true or 
not materially different from the truth , see see section 8 (3) (a) and (b) Defamation Act 1992; Burrows John 
"Review: Media Law" 2002 NZLR 217, 230; A defamatory statement can further be lawful if it falls within on 
category of what the law recognises as absolutely privileged statements or if it is a matter of public interest 
where everybody has the right to express his honest opinion. 
248 Burrows, as above n 247, 230. 
249 Adam v Ward [ 19171 AC 309. 334 Lord Atkinson. 
25° Fleming, as above n 222, 610-614; To be privileged, the disclosure of the information must be seen as more 
vital than the interest of third parties in their reputation, see Burrows, as above n 87, 89; however, the person 
making the statement must do so in good faith and without any improper motive. Examples of where qualified 
privilege will arise are reports of court proceedings, statements made at meetings of public bodies, and 
statements made in the investigation of crimes, see Burrows, as above n 87, 89; Lange, as above n 88, 385; 
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 71 ALJR 818. 
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A defamatory statement can further be lawful if it falls within on category of what the law 
recognises as absolutely privileged25 1 statements or if it is a matter of public interest where 
everybody has the right to express his honest opinion.252 
(b) Comparison 
This description shows that the New Zealand law of defamation might well provide an 
effective remedy in cases that fall within the German concept of privacy. Especially when a 
person's sexuality and thus his intimate sphere is concerned in Germany, it is likely that a 
publication lowers a person in the estimation of others and thus is defamatory in New Zealand. 
For example, the inferences in Garbett and Taylor can be compared to the German case 
described above in which the court held that a picture of a dressed woman printed next to an 
article about the awaking sexuality in spring infringed the intimate sphere of that woman. 
Further, speculations as to which of six men is the father of child may be defamatory in New 
Zealand. 
In reaching this result, the two legal jurisdictions take a different approach. German privacy 
law requires that an act must be private, for example fall within the intimate, personal or 
confidential sphere. Defamation law requires that a statement must be defamatory, for 
example lower a person in the estimation of others. On the other hand, both remedies provide 
for a similar justification. An intrusion into privacy253 can be justified on prevailing grounds 
of - inter alia - freedom of speech or the right of the public to be informed, a defamatory 
statement can be justified if it is, for example, true. New Zealand defamation law therefore 
provides for the protection of the individual's privacy if the matter complained is defamatory. 
On the other hand, the German right to privacy can also be infringed if the information 
disclosed or published is not defamatory. The publication of a serious love letter, for example, 
will most likely not lower a person in the estimation of others and hence not be defamatory 
but might well- as a very personal issue - infringe the author's p1ivacy. 
25 1 Absolute privilege applies to judges, lawyers and witnesses in legal proceedings, to MPs for things they say 
in Parliament, and to statements made by various officials dealing with affairs of state. There can be no liability 
in defamation for these statements, even if the person making the statement was motivated by malice, see 
Burrows, as above n 87, 83. 
252 Burrows, as above n 87, 128. 
253 Other than into the intimate sphere. 
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There are other significant differences between German pnvacy law and New Zealand 
defamation law. The aim of defamation law is to protect the individual's reputation in the 
outer world. This is also an aim of the law of privacy. But privacy is further concerned with 
the protection of certain spheres (in the inner world) of the individual in which he is to be let 
alone. It has been said that the law of defamation "protects the individual's good name and 
reputation in the world, not his or her privacy from the world".254 Analogously, the law of 
defamation requires a defamatory statement to be published to the public. Privacy can be 
infringed if somebody reads the diary, takes a picture of another person or observes him in his 
flat. In these cases, the person affected wi II no longer "be let alone". 
2 Trespass to land 
(a) Scope of protection 
Trespass can also be a means to protect privacy. Entering or remaining on , or directly causing 
any physical matter to come into contact with , land in the possession of another (whether of 
the landlord or a mere tenant) without consent is trespass. 255 Consent can result from an 
express permission that is not withdrawn or an implied permission.256 In TV3 v BSA the court 
held that "[p]urposes for which it is known or understood that the occupier would not give 
consent will be outside the ambit of implication."257 As the Court of Appeal in TV3 v Fahey 
neglected an implied license of a former patient to enter a doctors surgery for the purpose of 
covert filming 258 it can be supposed that covert filming under an implied license is nearly 
impossible. 
The land protected extends beyond the surface both above and below. Therefore, an 
individual's privacy can be protected against physical intrusions by other persons into the 
land in his possession.259 Further, a journalist or another person - with the intention to for 
example take pictures - can be liable in trespass for entering private premises. However, the 
mere photographing or filming of protected land without entering the land26
0 is no physical 
254 Caldwell, as above n 22, 92. 
255 Stepen Todd The Law of Torts in New Zealand (2ed Wellington, Brookers 1997) 460,461; Burrows, as above 
n 87,549,550. 
256 Todd ,as above n 254, 460, 461; Burrows, as above n 87, 549, 550. 
257 TV3 Network Services Ltd v Broadcasting Standards A11thority [ 1995] 2 NZLR 720, 732. 
258 TV3 Network Services Ltd v Fahey, 135. 
259 Rosalie P Balkin and Davis J L R Law of Torts Butterworths Sydney 1991 , 118. 
260 For example from adjoining premises, through a fence, from an aeroplane, or from the footpath. 
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intrusion and thus no trespass .26 1 However, under section 30 of the Summary Offences Act 
1981 peeping or peering into a dwelling house or loitering on any land on which a dwelling 
house is situated, is an offence that can be committed without entering the private premises. 
In Lomax it was held that this section is wide enough to catch not only the deliberate observer 
but also a seeker after information such as a private detective. 262 As to the fact it is not 
possible to take a picture while only having a casual glance section 30 is applicable to covert 
filming . Nevertheless , it is only a criminal offence if the actions are committed at night.263 
Additionally, it is not necessary to be actually present and looking during a covert filming act. 
Therefore it is possible to set up a camera during the day and depart. 264 
In the context of privacy protection, however, it often is of interest whether the plaintiff can 
prevent the publication of the pictures taken in the course of a trespass. For this purpose, the 
remedy of an injunction shall be described in more detail here. 
As there is not much authority in New Zealand the law is not well-defined. Therefore the 
Australian and English law could be a useful starting point to define the Jaw in New Zealand. 
In the English case Service v Channel Fou/65 inappropriate acts of the funeral directors ' 
employees were filmed by a hidden camera. The court held that the mere fact that a picture 
was obtained by trespass does not itself ground a claim for an injunction. Furthermore the 
court assumed that the rule preventing the grant of an interlocutory injunction where the claim 
was in defamation could not be extended to claims based on other causes of action.
266 
In Lincoln267 the defendant went to the plaintiff's premises to collect a cheque owed to her. 
She was accompanied by a reporter and a TV crew which filmed the premises and rooms of 
the plaintiff. It was found that she was liable in trespass. A justification in the public interest 
did not apply. The implied permission to enter the premises was only to those doing business 
with the firm. 268 The plaintiff further sought an injunction against the publication of the film. 
261 Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (193) 58 CLR 479 ; Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd 
v Phillip Morris Ltd (No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 414; Bathhurst , as above n 173, 704, Burrows, as above n 87, 548. 
262 Police v Lomax (1967) 12 MCD 151. 
263 The actions must becommitted at night. between one hour after sunset and one hour before sunrise ; Burrows, 
as above n 87 , 554. 
264 Law Commission as above n 171 , 22. 
265 Service Corporation International pie. v Chann el Four Television Corporation [ 1999] EMLR 83, 90. 
266 Sen1ice v Channel Four, as above n 265 , 84. 
267 Lincoln Hunt Australia Pty Ltd v Willesee (1986) 4 NSWLR 457. 
268 Lincoln , as above n 267 , 460. 
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Young J held that an injunction will be granted if three conditions are met. First, the 
circumstances must be such to make the publication unconscionable. If the defendant has 
engaged in criminal wrongdoing, this is an indication for unconscionability.269 Secondly, it 
has to be asked whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable damages (that can not be 
compensated) through the publication and, thirdly, whether the balance of convenience 
favours the grant of an injunction. Irreparable damages are such that are impossible of 
quantification. 270 Because these damages could not be shown in the case of the plaintiff, an 
injunction was not granted. The same unconscionability test was employed in the Emcorp-
? 7/ case.-
In the New Zealand case TV3 v Fahe/72 Richardson P suggested that 
the court, when considering the grant of an injunction, is required to weigh and balance 
the competing rights and values at stake. In that assessment the context and 
circumstances in which the impugned methods were employed, any special public 
interest considerations for broadcasting the programme, and the adequacy of damages as 
an available remedy for any wrong proved at trial, are amongst the considerations which 
must ordinarily be weighed. 273 
These decisions show that the factor determining whether an injunction would be granted was 
the degree of economic harm and whether damages would be an adequate form of 
compensation, rather than the infringement of the plaintiff's privacy. Privacy will be protected 
only as a by-product. Further, only the actual trespasser can be restrained from publishing 
material, but not a third party in the possession of such material. In Lenah,
274 the majority of 
the court, with Kirby J dissenting, held that an application for an injunction must identify the 
legal rights sought to be protected and must be in support of a recognised legal cause of action 
against the defendant. The ABC itself had not committed trespass. The unconscionability of 
the broadcast was, in itself, not a sufficient basis for relief. 
275 
269 Rinsale Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Commissio11 (1993) Aust Torts Reports 81. 
270 Rinsale, as above n 269,464. 
271 Emcorp v ABC [ 198812 Qd .R. 169. 
272 TV3 Network Services Ltd v v Fahey [1999] 2 NZLR 129. 
273 TV3 v Fahey , as above n 272, 9. 
274 ABC v Lenah, as above n 165, 63. 
275 See also Francis Trindade"Possums, Privacy and the implied freedom of communication" (2002) 10 Torts 
Law Journal 119; Stewart, as above n 212, 181; Lindsay, as above n 168, 102. 
43 
(b) Comparison 
In the first instance, the domestic home is protected similarly against physical intrusions by 
trespass in Germany and New Zealand. The scope of privacy protected by trespass is in some 
respects similar to German privacy law. The New Zealand tort of trespass protects the 
classical sphere of German privacy law, the domestic home. On the other hand, except for 
situations where section 30 of the Summary Offences Act 1981 is applicable, trespass is 
strictly linked to the possession of land. Contrary, the protection of German privacy extends 
beyond the domestic home. 
The means by which a trespass can be committed also differ from the protection of German 
privacy law. Trespass only protects against physical intrusions, mere observations from the 
outside are not prohibited. On the other hand, German privacy law protects against all 
intrusions as well as observations from the outside and publication of material obtained as a 
result of observations from the outside. Furthermore, trespass protects on the point of 
newsgathering where there is a physical intrusion rather than at the stage of broadcasting. In 
relation to the publication of material , trespass can provide for privacy protection only if the 
described conditions of an injunction as set out in Lincoln are met. 
3 Privacy Act 1993 
(a) Scope of protection 
The personal honour is broadly protected by defamation law in New Zealand.
276 In relation to 
informational privacy, reference has to be made to the Privacy Act 1993. Section 6 of the Act 
sets out 12 Information Privacy Principles that operate as guidelines and impose obligations 
as to the collection , storage, use and disclosure of personal information. This is any 
information about a person which identifies that person. 
Section 2 (1) makes clear that all kind of photographs are documents under the Act. 
Furthermore, as the Law Commission pointed out in its report on covert filming
277 the use of 
276 Reference can be made to the principles described above. 
277 Law Commission, as above n 171 , 18. 
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hidden cameras is at odds with Principle 3
278 and 4279 . Nevertheless, a complaint of privacy 
breach also requires a "significant humiliation, significant loss of dignity, or significant injury 
to the feelings of that individual"
280 or must have caused or possibly cause "loss, detriment, 
damage, or injury to that individual".
28 1 
Finally, the Act applies to public and private bodies. Therefore, state authorities and 
organisations as well as private institutions, employers and commercial firms are subject to 
the act. However, no such obligations will be imposed on most media organisations in relation 
to gathering, preparing, and broadcasting or publishing news for public broadcast. 
282 The 
existence of this important exemption led to the inapplicability of the Act in a decision of the 
Privacy Commissioner were a television technician had been covertly filmed during his work 
for a TV consumer programme which was considered as coming within the category of news 
or current affairs. 283 
(b) Comparison 
The Privacy Act protects a very broad area of privacy that is also protected under German 
privacy law. Nevertheless, it does not protect the personal honour but only personal 
information and has a lot of weak points, such as the fact that there is no interim injunction 
available. As most parts of the New Zealand media fall under the abovementioned exemption 
the Act has "no impact on the media at all and is therefore of little concem".
284 Additionally 
section 56 provides an exemption for all individuals collecting or retaining personal 
information for their own use or gratification.
285 Therefore, under the Act, it is possible for the 
media to covertly film other persons. Contrary, to German privacy law not even the intimate 
sphere is protected as an absolute one. Indeed, in a 2001 case the Privacy Commissioner held 
that a commissioned technician having access to the locations which is covertly filming a 
278 Principle 3: Collection of information from subject: ( 1) Where an agency collects personal information 
directly from the individual concerned, the agency shall take such steps (if any) as are, in the circumstances, 
reasonable to ensure that the individual concerned is aware of[ .. . ](2) The steps referred to in subclause ( I) of 
this principle shall be taken before the information is collected or, if that is not practicable, as soon as practicable 
after the information is collected.[ .. . ]. 
279 Principle 4: Manner of collection of personal information : Personal information shall not be collected by an 
agency (a) By unlawful means; or (b) By means that, in the circumstances of the case, (i) Are unfair; or (ii) 
Intrude to an unreasonable extent upon the personal affairs of the individual concerned. 
280 Section 66 (1) (b) (iii) of the Privacy Act 1993. 
28 1 Section 66 (1) (b) (i) of the Privacy Act 1993. 
282 Section 2 (1) (b) (xiii) of the Privacy Act 1993. 
283 Casenote 38197 [2003] NZPrivCmr 24. 
284 Burrows, as above n 87, 277. 
285 Law Commission, as above n 164, 20. Nevertheless, it may stop the people from disclosing private 
information to the media, so it does have an indirect impact on the media. 
theatre group in their dressing room breaches Principles l and 3.
286 However, the technician 
did not claim any of the exemptions to section 3, for example the aforementioned section 56. 
4 Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 
(a) Scope of protection 
Under this Act it is an offence to publish any matter that is objectionable.
287 As defined in 
section 2 not only any film, book, sound recording, picture, newspaper, photograph, 
photographic negative, photographic plate, or photographic slide, but also -after the 
amendment of the Act in 2005 which was intended to confirm the common law in Goodin
288
-
any disc and electronic or computer file are publications under the Act. 
The meanmg of 'objectionable' is defined in section 3 of the Act and protects pnvacy 
interests in a very broad manner. With regard to (intimate) covert filming there were several 
decisions under the Act were a publication was considered as objectionable in terms of 
section 3 (1) and (2) (a) because "it describes , depicts, expresses, or otherwise deals with 
matters such as sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence in such a manner that the availability 
of the publication is likely to be injurious to the public good" or promotes or supports "the 
exploitation of children, or young persons, or both, for sexual purposes". These cases include 
examples in which women were filmed up-skirt with a camera fixed in a shoe, filmed with 
cameras in bathrooms or a dressing area, and also children filmed with cameras in bedroom 
walls or hand-held cameras from behind a one-way window in a changing room.
289 In Living 
Word the Court of Appeal determined the scope of section 3 (1) and held that 
"[t]he words used in s3 limit the qualifying publications to those that can fairly be 
described as dealing with matters of the kinds listed. In that regard, too, the collocation of 
words "sex, horror, crime, cruelty or violence", as the matters dealt with, tends to point to 
activity rather than to the expression of opinion or attitude."
290 
286 Case Note 18302 [2001] NZPrivCmr 8. 
287 For example, section l23 of the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act makes it an offence to 
make, supply, distribute, display, advertise, or exhibit for supply or in expectation of payment, or deliver to any 
other person so that they can breach the act, an objectionable publication. 
288 Goodin v The Department of Internal Affairs [20031 NZAR 434. The court held that data stored in a computer 
file or folder or on a computer disk which, by the use of a computer or other machine can be displayed in the 
form of an image, came within the ambit of the term picture in the definition. 
289 The details of these cases are displayed in the Law Commission Paper, as above n 171 , 2, 15. 
290 Living Word Distributors Ltd v Human Rights Action Group (Wellington) (2000) CA58/00, para 28. 
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After Living Word the scope of privacy protection was highly confined and materials that are 
not generally of sexual activity were removed from the powers of the Chief Censor.
291 As a 
result the Chief Censor concluded in a 2003 case that the mere covertly filming of boys in a 
changing room of a swimming pool changing in and out of their clothing is not related with 
matters of sex and therefore is not 'objectionable' .
292 
(b) Comparison 
As a result of the Living Word decision significant elements of privacy that are protected 
within the German intimate sphere as absolute privacy rights are no longer protected under 
this Act. For example, the act is not applicable to computer image files and photographs of 
naked children or pictures that are the result of covert filming in general as long as they do not 
involve sexual behaviour.293 Also some material excluded by the Living Word decision is now 
covered because of an amendment to section 3 of the Act in 2005
294 the main scope of privacy 
protection is still limited to what is generally regarded as child pornography and pornography 
in general. 295 
5 Crimes (Intimate Covert Filming) Amendment Bill 
(a) Scope of protection 
In a study paper the Law Commission proposed an amendment of the Crimes Act 1961 to 
criminalise intimate covert filming. 296 Also an amendment of the Privacy Act 1993 was 
proposed to make civil remedies available in relation to covert filming.
297 Justice Minister 
Phil Goff in May 2005 stated that an amendment of the Privacy Act will be considered by 
Cabinet later 2005 but has not happened yet.
298 On the other side, the Crimes Amendment 
Bill299 was unanimously referred to the Government Administration select committee
300 and 
29 1 Law Commission, as above n 171, 17; Burrows, as above n 87, 473. 
292 Law Commission, as above n 171, 2, 16. 
293 Law Commission, as above n 171, 17; Burrows, as above n 87,473. 
294 See section 4 Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Amendment Act 2005. 
295 Law Commission. as above n 171, 17; Burrows, as above n 87, 466. 
296 Law Commission, as above n 171, 25. 
297 Law Commission, as above n 171, 26. 
298 Private Word Issue 54 May 2005, 3. 
299 Crimes (Intimate Covert Fi lming) Amendment Bill (12 April 2005 No 257-2). 
300 Private Word Issue 54 May 2005, 3. 
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reported with some recommendations that are "minor and technical in nature".
301 The Bill 
defines intimate covert filming as "the making of a surreptitious visual record of another 
person without that person's knowledge or consent and in circumstances that the person 
would reasonably expect to be private."302 As intimate visual recordings are defined in section 
216 G303 sections 216 H to J prohibit it to make, possess in certain circumstances, publish, 
import, export, or sell such recordings. Section 216 JA states that persons which are 
"exercising or performing any powers, duties, or functions under any enactment" are excluded 
from an application of the Act. This new law outlaws privacy invasions by covert filming of 
people in intimate situations and delivers a very clear definition of the covered situations. 
(b) Comparision 
The main parts that are protected within the German intimate sphere as absolute privacy rights 
would be covered under this new law. Nevertheless, other parts covered by the German 
intimate sphere, such as being filmed nude or partly nude if it was done where privacy could 
not be expected as for example on a beach, are not included.
304 Furthermore, the mere covert 
observation which also could fall within the German intimate sphere is not covered. 
As the filming of people in public or in non-intimate circumstances is also not outlawed under 
the new law305 not everything that falls within the German personal sphere is not covered. 
Finally, unlike in Germany the publication of images falling under the German intimate 
sphere can not be hindered if the picture was made with consent.
306 
30 1 Crimes (Intimate Covert Filming) Amendment Bill (2 August 2005 No 257-2), l. 
302 Crimes (Intimate Covert Filming) Amendment Bill (2 August 2005 No 257-2), l. 
303Section 216 G Intimate visual recording defined: (1) In sections 216H to 216M, intimate visual recording 
means a visual recording (for example, a photograph, videotape, or digital image) that is made in any medium 
using any device without the knowledge or consent of the person who is the subject of the recording, and the 
recording is of (a) a person who is in a place which, in the circumstances, would reasonably be expected to 
provide privacy, and that person is (i) naked or has his or her genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or female breasts 
exposed, partially exposed, or clad solely in undergarments; or (ii) engaged in an intimate sexual activity or (iii) 
engaged in showering, toileting, or other personal bodily activity that involves dressing or undressing or b a 
person's naked or undergarment-clad genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or female breasts which is made---(i) from 
beneath or under a person 's clothing; or (ii) through a person's outer clothing in circumstances where it is 
unreasonable to do so. (2) In section 216H, intimate visual recording includes an intimate visual recording that is 
made and transmitted in real time without retention or storage in---(a) a physical form; or (b) an electronic form 
from which the recording is capable of being reproduced with or without the aid of any device or thing. 
304 Law Commission, as above n 171, 39. 
305 Law Commission, as above n 171. 39. 
306 Law Commission, as above n 171, 39. 
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6 Broadcasting Act of 1989b 
The BSA was set up under part three of the Broadcasting Act of 1989 and has the jurisdiction 
to deal with privacy complaints. Under section 21 (1) (d) the BSA issued an advisory opinion 
with seven privacy principles. 307 These principles mirror many aspects of the tort of privacy 
and in addition cover beside the personal information also public information that has become 
private over time and intrusion.308 This wider approach of the privacy principles was accepted 
in TV3 v BSA309 because the Broadcasting Act had been passed before the tort of privacy 
evolved and the power to establish standards should not be limited by the new tort.
3 10 As parts 
of the principles and BSA decisions are used by the courts to guide the scope of the new tort 
the applicable decisions are not listed in this separate paragraph because they were mentioned 
at the respective paragraphs of the paper. This also resulted from the following reasons. 
Under part two of the Act, people may complain to the BSA if they consider that a radio or 
television programme has invaded their privacy or the privacy of another person. 
Nevertheless, also if the BSA upholds the complaint they have a number of not very strong 
enforcement powers, such as the power to order the broadcaster to publish a statement such as 
correction or apology or to order the broadcaster to pay reasonable costs and expenses of up 
to $ 5000 and also damages up to $ 5000 to the person whose privacy has been breached. In 
serious cases the BSA has the power to order a broadcaster off air, or not to play any 
advertising for up to 24 hours. Since 1998 damages were awarded only in two decisions.
3 11 
Additionally, under section 11 (b) the BSA has the power not to determine a complaint. In 
privacy cases this was exercised in very serious cases where the matters were highly sensitive 
and personal and the harm to the complainant would have been compounded by the issue of 
the BSA decision. 3 12 
307 See Appendix. 
308 Burrows, as above n 87. 257 . 
309 TV3 Network Services Lrd v Broadcasting Standards Authority [ 1995] 2 NZLR 720. 
3 10 Burrows, as above n 87. 257 . 
311 Burrows, as above n 87 , 271. 
312 Burrows, as above n 87,272. 
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7 Misappropriation of image 
New Zealand law provides protection against unauthorised use of someone's image without 
consent in a commercial way within the Fair Trading Act 1986
313
, the Advertising standards 
authority and the tort of passing off. Nevertheless, unlike the German privilege as to the own 
picture there is no protection against the making of photographs. As the German law on the 
privilege as to the own picture primarily protects a legal interest of an individual derived from 
his personality to decide whether a picture of him or her is made and published the 
aforementioned New Zealand law protects the oppo1tunity for exploiting one's established 
economic reputation commercially. 
In a non-commercial context the court in Hosking stated that there is no "cause of action in 
our law directed to unauthorised representation of one ' s image."
3 14 Therefore, New Zealand 
privacy law will protect the individual from unconsented publications of his portraits in a 
considerable number of cases in which the German privilege as to the own picture is 
applicable when the person portrayed is involved in a private act. Nevertheless, there is a 
main difference between the German privilege as to the own picture and a New Zealand right 
of privacy. The decisive point in assessing the lawfulness of the publication of a picture in 
New Zealand seems to be whether the person on that picture is involved in a private act or not. 
Contrary, the German Act on Artistic Creations - as a first step - acknowledges that every 
person has the right to decide whether a picture of his is to be published and that a publication 
is generally only lawful if he has consented. No element of privacy is necessary. Freedom of 
publication without consent exists only if one of the exceptions of§ 23 of the Act on Artistic 
Creations is applicable. 
Also complaints to the BSA or the Press council are likely to be fruitless as private facts have 
to be invaded. Additionally there is no protection within the Copyright Act 1994 and the 
Privacy Act 1993. 
313 See section 9 or 13 Fair Trading Act 1986. 
314 Hosking v Ru11ring, above n 16, 32 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
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VIII SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Even though privacy is one of the most significant human rights, the New Zealand laws do 
not protect privacy as such. Although the Court of Appeal has recognised a tort of privacy, 
intrusions into essential areas of an individual ' s privacy are not covered and important 
remaining questions are not clarified yet. 
The German general right to one's personality is derived from the constitutional protection of 
the human dignity and personality. Even though it is recognised that it also protects tangible 
interests,3 15 its main rationale and reason is the protection of human dignity. In providing for 
thi s protection , German law takes a conceptual approach. The first question that has to be 
asked in all cases in which an infringement of privacy is alleged - whether concerning images, 
the spoken word, personal data or other aspects of privacy - is whether an act falls within the 
scope of p1ivacy protection. It seems that many acts and much information can satisfy this 
criterion . The crucial point rather is whether the general right to one' s personality of the 
individual , balanced against other constitutional values, for example the freedom of press, 
prevails. Even though detailed rules (especially in relation to the privilege as to the own 
picture) have evolved throughout the years , this balance of interests always is - at the end of 
the day - the decisive factor. Nevertheless, the broad approach of Germany to privacy 
protection raises the question whether a similar approach is necessary for New Zealand. As 
both societies are very different and not as many privacy invasions occur in New Zealand as 
in Germany a narrower approach could be enough. 
It will be seen to what extent privacy and thus an aspect of human dignity will be directly 
protected in New Zealand. Apart from the evolving tort of privacy the recognised causes of 
action are primarily designed to protect other values and protect privacy only incidentally. For 
example, defamation law protects a person ' s reputation in the world, trespass the interest in 
having one 's land free from physical intrusions. Similarly, the ambit of and conditions to 
establish those recognised causes of action and the defences available differ. Unlike m 
Germany, there is no uniform balance of interests that has to be struck in every case. 
Apart from the evolving tort of privacy the recognised causes of action in New Zealand can 
protect privacy only in the described instances. Defamation is the closest the law comes to 
315 BGH Marlene Dietrich [2000] GRUR 709; BGH Der blaue Engel [2000]GRUR, 715 . 
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protecting pnvacy, especially when very intimate information is concerned. However, in 
contrast to privacy protection, it requires both a defamatory meaning and publication. 
Therefore, at the moment New Zealand law does not protect privacy in several respects in 
which German privacy law provides for protection. First the individual commonly has no 
right to decide if, where and how a pictorial portrait of his is published. Secondly, the 
individual can generally not protect himself against intrusions into his private sphere or 
against observations. As described, a New Zealand right of privacy will in many instances fill 
this gap of privacy protection if an act or information has a private character. It might protect 
much private information, establish a right as to the own picture in a considerable number of 
cases or protect against other intrusions into privacy. 
Coming back to the second example described in the introduction , it was suggested that the 
lovers would have a legal remedy against the publication of the picture on the Internet only in 
Germany where their image would be protected by the privilege as to the own picture. Since 
the lovers are neither an absolutely nor relatively a personality of contemporary history, the 
publication without consent would be unlawful. In New Zealand, the recognised forms of 
action do not provide for legal protection. Defamation law is not applicable because the 
publication does not bear any defamatory imputation. Trespass cannot be established because 
the neighbour did not enter any premises. Finally, the making of one single picture does not 
amount to nuisance. Nevertheless, the situation might fall within the amendment of the 
Crimes Act if it can be seen as "an intimate sexual activity" or if a person is "naked or has his 
or her genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or female breasts exposed, partially exposed, or clad 
solely in undergaiments". On the other hand, also evolving forms of action could provide the 
lovers with a legal remedy in New Zealand. A right of privacy might apply because the 
scenery in the garden has a necessary private character. A publication of this picture can well 
be considered as highly offensive to a reasonable person. If the lovers were not aware of the 
photographer, the picture would further have been taken surreptitiously. 
As described, the recognised causes of action do not sufficiently protect privacy in respects 
that are not intimate but fall within the "classical" area of privacy protection , for example 
photographs taken without consent or intrusions into seclusion. Like every developed country, 
New Zealand has not stopped short of the development of information and surveillance 
technologi es which enable an always increasing number of intrusions into privacy. Mobile 
phones with built-in cameras are good examples. 
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